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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the following questions. Why does a relatively low level of trust 
characterize U.S.-Mexican defense relations? Has the long-shared history of the two 
policies helped or hindered the building of trust? What are the main obstacles to the 
strengthening a military-to-military partnership based on trust? In particular, what should 
the U.S. military do to ensure better cooperation between both militaries to meet the 
security challenges confronting North America and beyond in the twenty-first century? 
This thesis will determine why prior U.S.-military engagements with the Mexican 
military have been ineffective in shaping a relationship based on trust. This research 
study highlights the historical and cultural paradigms that have challenged the 
relationship between the U.S. and Mexican militaries. The focus of this research is not to 
blame the professionalism and effectiveness of the Mexican military to combat these 
security challenges, but to study a policy environment, and provide policy 
recommendations of trust-building mechanisms to be incorporated (from the U.S. side) to 
help build a solid relationship built on trust, not capabilities. Finally, this study addresses 
key factors that have prevented a trust-building program, and will outline a range of 
policy options that the U.S. military forces can use to build a much-needed trust between 
these two institutions.    
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Military relations between the United States and Mexico have historically been a 
rollercoaster of geopolitical dilemmas that have led Mexicans to develop a sense of 
skepticism in U.S.-foreign policies. Since 9/11, after seeing the increase of different 
security challenges on both sides, the idea of a strong relationship between both armed 
forces seemed necessary; however, relations between these two institutions have been far 
from close. In 2002, the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was 
established to provide command and control of the Department of Defense (DOD) 
homeland defense efforts and theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and the 
Bahamas.1 Despite efforts to increase security cooperation assistance through political 
programs—such as the Merida Initiative—the United States stills fails to establish a solid 
trust with its neighbor’s military. So, is the Mexican military prepared to confront 
ongoing and future security challenges? How much assistance is the U.S. providing to the 
Mexican military? More importantly, is the U.S. military taking the right steps through its 
security cooperation initiatives to meet the security challenges, and to reinforce effective 
trust-building mechanisms in military-to-military engagements with Mexico?    
This thesis focuses on the following questions. Why does a relatively low level of 
trust characterize U.S.-Mexican defense relations? Has the long-shared history of the two 
policies helped or hindered the building of trust? What are the main obstacles to the 
strengthening of a military-to-military partnership based on trust? In particular, what 
should the U.S. military do to ensure better cooperation between both militaries to meet 
the security challenges confronting North America and beyond in the twenty-first 
century? 
 
                                                 
1 USNORTHCOM, “About USNORTHCOM,” USNORTHCOM, 
http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx.  
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This thesis will determine why prior U.S.-military engagements with the Mexican 
military have been ineffective in shaping a relationship based on trust. This research 
study highlights the historical and cultural paradigms that have challenged the 
relationship between the U.S. and Mexican militaries. The focus of this research is not to 
blame the professionalism and effectiveness of the Mexican military to combat these 
security challenges, but to study a policy environment and provide policy 
recommendations of trust-building mechanisms to be incorporated (from the U.S. side) to 
help build a solid relationship build on trust, not capabilities. Finally, this study addresses 
key factors that have prevented a trust-building program, and will outline a range of 
policy options that the U.S.-military forces can use to build a much-needed trust between 
these two institutions.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The relationship between Mexico and the United States is unique to others in the 
region. The economic interdependence and the increasing cultural ties bring these two 
countries together; however, military relations have not been the most solid. Trust has 
been a critical issue that determines the success of this relationship. Historical and 
constitutional factors have prevented the relationship between these two militaries to 
flourish. A misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the Mexican military, and the 
established priorities and strategy by the unified command, have potentially hindered the 
efforts to truly build a partnership centered in trust. A disconnect between U.S. counter-
narcotic aid and institution-building programs, has become troublesome when 
establishing continuity of relations between these institutions.2 After exploring this 
disconnection, it is important to identify the need to analyze potential policy options that 
can assist in building trustworthiness within an institution.  
A research study that analyzes the internal and external policies within these two 
military institutions, and seeks to further understand the cultural barriers that challenge 
policy-making, is crucial when examining the association. The U.S. armed forces should 
                                                 
2 Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Benjamin Bahney and K. Jack Riley, Security in Mexico: Implications for 
US Policy Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009).  
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fully understand the internal institutional challenges the Mexican armed forces face 
before determining strategies to build an effective trusting partnership. It is critical to 
identify the root of faulty strategies that have been ineffective in establishing the U.S. 
military’s trustworthiness. The Mexican view of the U.S. hegemony, in particularly in the 
Western hemisphere, has made this relationship more difficult. There are many reasons to 
increase the degree of military-to-military cooperation between two countries, given the 
positive interdependence in other aspects of the relation. Yet, it seems that the 
relationship is far apart when compared to other countries in the Western Hemisphere. 
Despite all the U.S.-military assistance in the war against drugs, it is difficult to measure 
the success of these initiatives, if the relationship between these two institutions remains 
incompatible.  
Similar to those used for the Canadian Armed Forces, there are other alternatives 
to DOD practices that could produce a synergic relationship between the United States 
and Mexico. These include an array of institutional practices that focus on education, and 
develop the professionalism and partnership of both countries’ future military leaders. In 
addition to providing military equipment and technical experience to confront current 
security challenges, the DOD could establish and increase professional development 
programs that focus on building cross-cultural relations. USNORTHCOM, as well as 
other combatant commands, could incorporate a trust-building metric that would track the 
foundation and development of this relationship. The need to continually assess these 
programs is crucial. The United States should not only demonstrate its building 
partnership capabilities, but should also focus on its commitment, honesty, and reliability 
to its allied armed forces. As we study these relationships in detail, a number of obstacles 
and challenges become apparent. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Many negative factors become apparent when discussing U.S.-Mexico defense 
relations. Studies have shown domestic politics as the direct source that impedes these 
two institutions from developing a trustworthy relationship. The domestic “political 
realities” affecting U.S. and Mexican military assistance become more apparent, because 
 4 
internal politics limit the cooperation intentions.3 On the other hand, there are initiatives 
that these two institutions must maintain to keep an open door to future cooperation and 
trust. Cultural differences between both countries are enormous, limiting the chance of 
having a productive relationship, particularly given its past. As Alan Riding observed,  
Probably nowhere in the world do two countries as different as Mexico 
and the United States live side-by-side. Probably nowhere in the world do 
two neighbors understand each other so little. More than by levels of 
development, the two countries are separated by language, religion, race, 
philosophy, and history.4  
These differences are often forgotten when establishing policies affecting bilateral 
relations; however, according to Raúl Benítez Manaut, “[W]hen there are huge 
differences, the friction, the conflicts, and the wrong perceptions become more difficult 
to overcome and manage.”5 Are U.S. military policies encouraging this separation, or 
instead closing the gap between these differences?   
The U.S. continues to struggle in defining a relationship that should focus more 
on building trust, rather than enhancing Mexico’s capabilities. Trust building does not 
happen organically, because it goes against a natural bias. Instead of devoting its time in 
rebuilding its trustworthiness, the DOD strategy focuses on building its capacity by 
providing the necessary equipment and technical training to fight a war that has led to 
many consequences resulting from the militarization in Mexico. Arturo Sotomayor 
highlights that “[M]ilitarization yielded four suboptimal and unintended consequences,”6 
which include repressive policing, negative effects on accountability and human rights, 
and spillover effects on the Central American region.7 Militarization in Mexico has been 
a response to an internal security threat that continues to pressure its civilian leaders. The 
                                                 
3 Craig A. Deare, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface,” Strategic Forum, no. 
243 (July 2009).  
4 Ibid. 
5 Raúl Benítez Manaut, “Mexico-Estados Unidos: Paradigmas De una Inevitable Y Conflictiva 
Relación,” Nueva Sociedad, no. 206 (2006), 140.  
6 Arturo C. Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and its Implications,” in The State and Security in 
Mexico: Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, ed. Brian Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 49.  
7 Ibid. 
 5 
pressure of creating such policies derives from the internal societal demands and the 
international players who seek an answer to this security threat.8 As Mexico continues to 
fight against transnational criminal organizations (TCO), it must develop a highly 
effective law-enforcement institution that can take over this role. Jose Francisco Gallardo 
points out, 
If the state is able to obtain a structural demilitarization, the armed forces 
will be the first to benefit, and gradually abandon, their commitments to 
the Plan DN-II [National Defense Plan], paving the way for the eventual 
professionalization of the Armed Forces.9  
The U.S. must continue to provide the necessary assistance, not only to overcome this 
threat, but also to facilitate the transition of this role to a law-enforcement establishment.  
The problem lies in the lack of professionalization required to combat TCOs.  The 
United States continues to focus on building partnership capacity, without molding the 
core of an institution that continues to develop a cadre of military professionals who still 
resent the past. The Merida Initiative was a tool used by the U.S. government to: 
(1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) strengthen 
border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of justice 
systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug 
demand.10  
In spite of the intent to open relations with the Mexican government, the Merida 
initiative was quite limited in establishing a trustworthy relationship with the Mexicans. 
It was certainly not a “Plan Colombia,” but many were led to believe that the Merida 
Initiative would spark a new beginning of U.S.-Mexican defense relations.      
Another roadblock that hinders relations is the domestic politics on both sides. 
Historically, both militaries have been extremely subordinate to civilian leadership. Brian 
Bow highlights that the post-revolutionary regime in Mexico controlled so much of the 
foreign policy bureaucracy that it did not permit military officers to directly interact with 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jose Francisco Gallardo, Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico (Mexico D.F.: 
Global Exchange and Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria, 2000).  
10 Jordi Diez and Ian Nicholls, The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition (Mexico: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2006), 6.  
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U.S. officers.11 Political considerations are taken into account before making any policies 
that might not favor the populace. This was evident during President Miguel Aleman’s 
administration, where he rejected a bilateral-military assistance pact that the Mexican 
Armed Forces were anticipating to appease the populist wing of the party and strengthen 
the next presidential candidate.12    
When the United States government publicly defies any of the Mexican 
institutions, it throws a huge wrench in the information-sharing process between these 
two governments. Mexican officials will cease to provide crucial information in 
counterdrugs operations. These types of incidents continue to erode relations between the 
DOD and the two Mexican armed forces secretariats, Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional 
(SEDENA), and Secretaria de Marina (SEMAR). Nonetheless, a strong relationship and 
understanding of the intrinsic role and mission of each other is crucial to the maintenance 
of the relationship, regardless of political influences.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Analysis of U.S.-Mexico defense relations centers around three different 
categories: the historical background and current status of defense relations, the legit 
understanding of cultural differences between these two institutions, and the policy 
options the U.S. must incorporate to build a trustworthy relation. Many articles on these 
three topics will tend to validate each other; however, there are several disagreements on 
the approach and the status of current relations and policy options. The literature touches 
on differences in each culture, but it seldom emphasizes the effect of this crucial cultural 
misunderstandings. Further analyses conducted by different U.S. governmental agencies 
prove that the focus of a new strategy for bilateral cooperation relies on high technical 
equipment and training, but not on institutional building.13  
                                                 
11 Brian Bow, “Beyond Merida?:The Evolution of the U.S. Response to Mexico’s Security Crisis,” in 
The State and Security in Mexico: Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, ed. Brian Bow and 
Arturo Santa-Cruz (New York: Routledge, 2013).  
12 Roderic Ai Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992).  
13 Schaefer, Bahney, and Riley, Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Policy Options.  
 7 
From an historical analysis, it is quite evident that the Mexican Armed Forces 
have been subordinate to civilian leadership. Roderic A. Camp suggests that there are 
original conditions, apart from other Third World cultures, that caused the Mexican 
military’s subordination to civil authorities. These conditions included the extreme 
emphasis in subordination at formation and professional development courses, military 
autonomy in its own internal affairs, and the use of a military-political officer in the past 
to intercede for the military.14 In a thorough research study conducted by the Global 
Exchange and the Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción 
Comunitaria (Ciepac), the author, Jose F. Gallardo, explains that this relationship was 
molded by a non-written civil-military pact that has been enforced since the 1940s, when 
the presidency, for the first time since the Mexican revolution, was passed down to 
civilian authority. Gallardo explains that this pact was based on two unwritten rules. The 
first one was that the President would grant absolute respect to the military, and the 
second rule would give that same respect to civilian rule.15 Although these tactics are 
used by both studies, it remains certain that there is a strong link between these two 
institutions. The military has been remained loyal to the civilian rule. Frederich Katz, one 
of the prominent writers about the Mexican revolution and its military, discusses how the 
Mexican Army has a “clearly observable antimilitarist tradition.”16 Other studies agree 
that since the birth of the country, “the Mexican Army was instrumental in building the 
state apparatus, and providing social cohesion to the new political entity, all while 
centralizing the power in Mexico City.”17 Nonetheless, the Mexican military has been in 
the past decade in an unfamiliar territory, where its political intentions, its loyalty to 
civilian rule, and its current role in the war against organized crime is in question. It is 
critical to analyze the development of this relationship in order to understand how all this 
led to its current relations with the U.S. Armed Forces. 
                                                 
14 Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico, 6. 
15 Gallardo, Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico, xv. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Diez and Nicholls, The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition. 
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The redirection of the Mexican military role in internal security has certainly 
bonded these two institutions, but it has also created several unintended internal and 
external unintended consequences. Arturo C. Sotomayor argues that the militarization 
policy in Mexico has led to unintended bad consequences. From a repressive, or “mano 
dura” approach towards crime fighting, an increase in human-rights abuses, the erosion 
of the civilian oversight, to the spillover effects on the Central American region, these 
implications are a constant reminder of a failed policy that was influenced by societal 
demand and external pressures.18 On the other hand, Inigo Guevara Moyano analyzes this 
change in policy from a positive point of view; he argues that the counter-drug role has 
influenced the modernization of the armed forces.19 A common ground by these two 
authors, and data from the Guevara, indicates that the human rights abuse incidents have 
increased since the militarization. A congressional research conducted by Ribando Seelke 
and Flinkea, highlights that, like Sotomayor’s argument of the spillover effects in the 
Central American region, the effect of this militarization also has potential “spillover” 
violence in the United States.20 Again, the militarization in Mexico is a complicated 
condition that has brought the relationship between these two militaries to a new turning 
point never seen before.     
Very little has been written on the current defense relations between these two 
countries; however, most of the studies indicate that the main issue that prevents this 
relationship to flourish relies on the lack of trust that exists on both sides. Benitez Manaut 
recognizes that “distrust” has been the constant element between the U.S.-Mexico since 
1830, when Mexico suspected that the U.S. was assisting in the independence of Texas. 
Other research studies continue to focus this same element as a fundamental reason for 
the current relations between these two parties. In 2009, Craig A Deare pronounced the 
U.S.-Mexico defense relations as an incompatible interface. Deare “refers to the fact that 
the armed forces that operate to the north and the south of the shared borders are quite 
                                                 
18 Sotomayor, Militarization in Mexico and its Implications, 49. 
19 Inigo Guevara Moyano, Adapting, Transforming, and Modernzing under Fire: The Mexican 
Military 2006–11, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 
20 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida 
Initiative and Beyond (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013).  
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distinct, and the ‘connections’ between them are incongruent.”21 Deare also argues that 
the obstacles to cooperation on both sides impede these institutions to collaboratively and 
effectively conduct anti-drug trafficking operations.22 Some of the U.S. obstacles he 
highlights are the lack of attention to Mexico that leads to an unorganized structure of 
priorities: (1) allocation of a security cooperation mission to a command whose mission 
is solely focus to anticipate and conduct homeland defense and civil support operations 
(USNORTHCOM); (2) the priorities on combat operations external to the continental 
territory of the country; (3) the political realities in the United States; and (4) the lack of 
trust that exists between these two sides.23  
In a completely different argument, Renuart and Baker refute Deare’s assessment 
by describing Deare’s conclusion as an, “outdated U.S.-Mexico paradigm that preceded 
the 9/11 attacks and recent counter-drug operations in Mexico.”24 Renuart and Baker 
discredit most of Deare’s assertions and conclusions regarding the obstacles that both 
sides encounter; except for the fact that the political realities limit the U.S.-Mexico 
defense relations. As Sotomayor also contends, “the civil-military balance of power has 
serious policy implications for U.S.-Mexican relations.”25 Dr. Richard D. Downie 
highlights another optimistic approach on the relations between these two institutions. Dr. 
Downie asserts that President Calderon’s decision in 2006 to militarize the efforts to 
combat the TCOs and to collaborate with the U.S. in that effort resulted in the best 
defense relations these countries have endured in decades. 26 However, Mexicans 
elaborate that this is a strategy for subordination of Mexico to the U.S. corporate and 
national security interests and that the U.S. are insisting that the primary functions of the 
Mexican military “should be altered from their roles as guarantors of national and 
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territorial sovereignty to a repressive force to contend with possible internal enemies: 
drug trafficking, counterinsurgency, police work, and domestic control.”27 Once again, 
trust becomes the overwhelming factor that persists to damage the true intentions of each 
side. This inconsistency of perceptions can summarize the differences and the 
misunderstanding of each other intentions, but most importantly, each other’s culture. 
The cultural differences are little explored or recorded; however, it becomes an 
important factor to understand how to establish effective policies and strategies, which 
can bring mutual benefits and results. A complete misunderstanding continues to bring 
challenges in this relation. Deare illustrates, 
They both conceive of, send, and receive ‘signal’ in distinct fashions, with 
neither of the two being ‘correct’ in and of themselves. Despite being 
neighbors, their origins, circumstances, and shared history have caused 
them to evolve in different fashions, resulting in quite dissimilar 
organizational cultures, responsibilities, mission, orientations, and 
capabilities.28  
This statement presents the idea that there must be a mutual understanding of each 
other’s culture, history, and necessities in order to bridge the gap. After conducting 
further research, it is evident that often we tend to shoot ourselves in the foot due to 
ignorance. The research study will focus on key cultural distinctions we must recognize 
to succeed in building partnership trust, and create effective bilateral defense policy 
options.  
Throughout this research, numerous policy recommendations regarding the U.S. 
efforts to fight this common threat have been recorded. Since 9/11, the U.S. and Mexico 
were forced to work closer together to handle numerous security threats and border 
issues. Analysis from a defense cooperation standpoint, and the plethora of organizations 
involved in the efforts to assist Mexico with this common threat, tend to opaque the 
reality that a much bigger effort and sacrifice must be employed by the U.S. government, 
to show our trustworthiness to our neighbors. Most of the policy options presented focus 
on what we can give the Mexican to help them out; however, Schaefer, Bahney, and 
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Riley present one of the most sound policy alternatives or recommendations in this study. 
They highlight the fact that most of the security assistance to Mexico has been focused on 
the transfer of technology and equipment to satisfy their immediate needs; however, the 
focus should be more on building institutions that can be trusted.29 Dr. Downie presents 
the option for the continuation in the support of the Calderon’s administration strategy;30 
however, with a new party taking control of the foreign affairs, this might be changing 
rapidly. It is time to look at defense relation strategies that will help the U.S. military 
bridge the gap of past perceptions and true cooperation and trust. Trust issues will 
continue to erode the relationship if they are not handled properly. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This study is organized to understand the historical effects of the policies in place 
by U.S. and Mexican governments and militaries. A cross-cultural analysis will help 
identify areas where both institutions have failed to recognize ways to overcome the 
challenges of establishing and reinforcing a solid defense relationship. Nevertheless, the 
thesis primarily focuses on what the United States has done, and whether such actions are 
the right steps to enhance bilateral relations. The following research will include an 
analysis and an historical study of the relations of both militaries. A comprehensive 
assessment of the different security cooperation programs in Latin America will present 
evidence of the underpinning issues that security cooperation strategies must be used in 
Mexico. Moreover, the research study will highlight an intense review of Spanish and 
English literature that will demonstrate the key determinants and challenges that continue 
to affect these military-to-military engagements.   
A literature review on the Mexican Armed Forces and an historical study of past 
events is imperative to understand the areas that truly need to improve in order to gain 
Mexico’s trust. Mexican publications, theses, institutional data from government agencies 
(such as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)), are used to analyze the current strategy and potential policy options. Other 
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research on current U.S.-Mexico initiatives are used to affirm the lessons learned from 
past mistakes and successes that should force us to reevaluate our commitment strategies 
with Mexico. Finally, the exploration of a trust-building model is necessary to underline 
policy options that will enable the military relations to its highest level.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter I introduces the thesis research. 
Chapter II provides a background on the Mexican military, and points out the differences 
in culture and structure between its Northern counterparts. Chapter II will also analyze 
the structural differences and the cultural roadblocks that hinder their relationship. This 
study also presents an analysis and the effects of an extreme vertical culture that has 
historically limited its ability to effectively professionalize the third-largest military in 
Latin America. Chapter II will finally focus on the professional development of its officer 
corps and provide a historical breakdown that will help us understand the potential future 
of the Mexican military in domestic and international affairs.   
Chapter III will present an historical background of the U.S.-Mexico relations. 
This chapter focuses on the historical background to the Mexican wariness of allowing 
foreign troops onto Mexican soil, even in an advisory or training capacity. The 
constitutional policies in Mexico, and the constant border issues, challenge a relationship 
of continuous suspicion or concern often directed at the United States in particular. 
Besides dissecting the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) strategies and 
policies toward security cooperation in Mexico, this chapter presents a statistical analysis 
of the security cooperation efforts, through international military education and training 
(IMET) data, as to where the proper strategies developed by USNORTHCOM were 
effective in establishing a trusting relationship with the Mexican armed forces. Finally, 
Chapter IV examines the contemporary perils and possibilities central to transforming the 
U.S.-Mexico Defense Relationship into a connection with greater depth and trust and 
provides an overall conclusion to this theses research.   
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES 
To appreciate uniqueness of the Mexican Armed Forces, Latin American regional 
experts should understand the history, structure, culture, transformation, and 
modernization of this institution, compared with the rest of the Western Hemisphere. 
Unlike other militaries in the region, the Mexican military has not been as thoroughly 
examined or researched because of its far more limited engagements in politics, 
compared to its neighbors to the South. A detailed understanding of the Mexican Armed 
Forces, along with a structural and cultural comparison to the U.S. Armed Forces, is 
critical to assess the type of cooperation initiatives employed by the U.S. Armed Forces, 
when building trust between these two institutions. This chapter will present the historical 
background regarding the rise of the Mexican military, examine the main professional 
cultural differences, and highlight the challenges it faces and the importance in 
acknowledging these in the efforts to better understand this institution. It will be made 
clear that organizational and cultural differences between these two institutions are key 
factors to consider when developing defense policies and strategies in security 
cooperation.  
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES 
1. Historical Background of Mexican Military 
Since the early stage of its creation, the Mexican military developed a sense of 
autonomy in its own affairs. Nevertheless, a study of its Mexican historical evolution 
reveals a “perverse cycle” of Militarization–Revolution–Demilitarization–
Democratization–Remilitarization.31 This section will illustrate and analyze the evolution 
of the Mexican armed forces through these distinct phases in Mexican history. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the political instability in Mexico, and the stability of 
a government after the revolution, have been the main causes for altering the civil-
military relations and the role of the military as a functioning body.   
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After winning its independence in 1821, Mexico had the highest militarization in 
the world. Throughout this period, the need to invest in an army that could defend the 
sovereignty of a new nation from imperial powers was the main catalyst for the 
militarization in Mexico. After analyzing historical data, there was one soldier for every 
500 Mexican citizens. Later, during the French invasion, there was one soldier for every 
117 citizens. During the “Porfiarato” (the era of Porfirio Diaz dictatorship), the ratio 
moved to 1/376, and by the early 1900s, there was an average of one military soldier per 
530 citizens. Figure 1 identifies the militarization of the Mexican Armed Forces. Military 
personnel also filled many of the important government positions. According to Gallardo, 
“the Armed Forces served as a privileged trampoline for its soldiers, who later went on to 
hold important public offices, such as Interior Minister, governor, deputy, senator, 
ambassador, or manager of a state enterprise.”32 It was evident that the government had a 
stronghold on military affairs and vice versa. Military influence in civil affairs became a 
commonality throughout this militarization period.33    





Figure 1.  Militarization in Mexico (Number of Civilians per Soldier)34 
The Mexican Revolution brought a staggering increase of military soldiers. By the 
end of the revolution, there was one military for every 160 citizens. The Revolutionary 
armies, led by Francisco (Pancho) Villa and Emiliano Zapata, eventually shrunk and 
became subordinate to the regular armed forces led by Venustiano Carranza. During this 
period, the military absorbed more than 50 percent of government expenses. According to 
the historian Edwin Lieuwen, after the Revolution, the Mexican military budget made 
this country one of the most militarized countries in the world. The Mexican Revolution 
and its post-revolutionary regime were the two main factors shaping the Mexican 
military.35 The Constitution of 1917 delineated the roles and restrictions of the military 
                                                 
34 Ibid.; “A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Mexico, “Red de 
Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina, http://www.resdal.org/atlas/atlas10-ing-21-mexico.pdf.  
35 Gallardo, Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico, 3. 
 16 
continue to stand to this date. Hence, the military institution became completely subject 
to its civilian authorities.36  
A true Mexican military subordination to its civilian counterparts initiated in the 
1930s. Demilitarization efforts and the orientation towards the supremacy of civilian 
authorities was the exception to the rest of the countries in the Western Hemisphere. The 
founding of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), which evolved later into the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) by Plutarco Elias Calles, set “the groundwork of 
the beginnings of the transition from a revolutionary to an institutional army, and from a 
military directly involved in politics to one functioning as a separate state actor.”37 The 
changes that shifted the power to the presidents came during President Lázaro Cardenas. 
Cardenas made radical changes that shook the military institutions. Professionalization of 
the armed forces became the cornerstone of the military institution, which forced the 
removal of politically active officers. Donald Harrison highlighted that “Cardenas 
eliminated from the officer corps men who had come up through the revolutionary army 
by virtue of politics and favoritism.”38 Cardenas focused on developing a leaner, more 
efficient, and loyal armed forces. Another structural change made by Cardenas, in effort 
to reduce its military power, was the separation of two separate military entities (the 
Army and the Navy). These changes, followed by a strict development of loyal armed 
forces that led to stabilization of internal politics, prepared the government to the 
transition of a civilian-controlled state.39 
After 71 years of a single party (PRI) controlled-presidency, democratization 
tested the loyalty of the military institutions to the state for the first time. During the PRI 
years, the military was in the shadow of its civilian authority. When President Miguel 
Aleman took office in 1946, as the first civilian head of state since the revolution, a 
“Non-written Civil-Military Pact” was established between the civilian leadership of the 
PRI and the Mexican military. This pact set the conditions for the President to grant 
                                                 
36 Ibid., xvi–3. 
37 Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico, 20.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 19–21. 
 17 
absolute respect to the military institutions, and in turn, for the military to give equal 
respect to its civilian leadership. However, the Mexican armed forces had obliged to 
follow a set of rules, doctrines, and institutional norms that were established since 
President Calles took office. The stagnation of a military that had developed an institution 
loyalty to a singular party and has yet to evolve its structure has caused friction in this 
democratization process. Unlike some other countries in the region where 
democratization has led to demilitarization, Mexico’s democracy has coincided with 
militarization as it enters into a state of internal security issues. Civil-military relations 
have been tested because these new security dilemmas challenge civilian autonomy and 
legitimacy.40  
2. A Profound Civil-Military Relation 
The “Non-written Civil-Military Pact” is the framework for the close relationship 
between the Mexican Armed Forces and the PRI. Constitutionally, the Mexican Armed 
Forces were designed to be a “professional and apolitical institution.”41 Nevertheless, the 
embedded military within the PRI has created an institutional crisis as it violates the 
principles of a democratic state led by civilian authority. The Mexican constitution that 
has been questioned within its own institutions—as it faces new security challenges and 
attempts to position Mexico in the global stage—establishes the constitutional framework 
under which the Mexican Armed Forces operate. The public and other international 
players continue to challenge the redirection of the Mexican military mission and its role 
concerning internal security.42   
Politicians have traditionally ignored the missions and roles of the Mexican 
Armed Forces. After six iterations of the National Defense Plan, which outlines five 
separate roles for the Mexican military, the Plan has yet to determine a role for the 
Mexican Armed Forces in the global arena. The Constitution of 1917 limited the use of 
the Mexican Armed forces abroad during peacetime; however, the internal roles are 
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somehow defined, but continually questioned by the public. The Mexican Army and Air 
Force are responsible for the following: 1) defend the integrity, independence, and 
sovereignty of the nation; 2) ensure internal security; 3) provide assistance to the civilian 
sectors in cases of public needs; 4) conduct civic and social activities for the development 
of the country; and 5) assist in disaster relief and maintain order to help reconstruct the 
affected areas.43 The Navy (SEMAR) serves two stated missions: the use of naval power 
to ensure external defense, and the assistance in internal security matters; however, 
recently, the Navy has been more involved in assisting SEDENA. The collaborative 
efforts in building a functioning-joint environment are rare in the history of these two 
institutions. After President Calderon assumed the presidency, he tasked SEDENA to 
elaborate a Sectorial Plan of National Defense, as an instrument to plan and conduct 
military activities in accordance with the priorities and objectives identified in the 
National Development Plan.44 This document is equivalent to the U.S. National Security 
Strategy, and is an attempt to provide a sense of transparency on the military’s new role 
as it prepares to combat the internal criminal organizations. The way in which the 
Mexicans confronted this issue was somehow different from how the United States 
prepared to assist the Mexican military. The two military structures and cultures were so 
different from one another that cooperation became a constant challenge. 
3. A Divided Defense Ministry 
The structure of the Mexican armed forces is complex and different from all the 
other militaries in the Western Hemisphere. President Lázaro Cárdenas introduced a 
structural change that had the potential to reduce the military’s power and expand its 
range of skills; he divided the Mexican Armed Forces, the Secretariat of War (SEDENA) 
and Navy (SEMAR), into two autonomous departments, which left the Mexican Air 
Force subordinate to its army counterpart.45 The effects of these structural changes are  
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still felt today. Other military organizations that are independent from the Army and 
Navy command structures include the Corps of Military Police, Special Forces units, and 
the Presidential Guards.  
In February 2013, President Peña-Nieto ordered both defense ministries to 
develop a Joint National Defense Policy. Inigo Guevara Moyano explained, “this policy 
should lead to a redefinition of the Mexican Defense system and its linkages with other 
sectors of the federal government.”46 The rivalries between these military institutions 
hindered the way they jointly operated. The new internal security challenges forced these 
institutions to work together. What remain unknown is whether this is the beginning of a 
General Staff or Joint Chief of Staff. Nevertheless, both ministries maintain a very linear 
structure with extreme loyalty to their civilian leadership. Figure 2 displays the advisory 
relationship and command reporting line of the Mexican Armed Forces. 
 
Figure 2.  Division of the Mexican Armed Forces.47 
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4. Transformation and Evolution 
Unlike its Northern counterpart, the Mexican military had acted mainly in internal 
affairs. In the early part of the twentieth century, it was formed to execute light infantry 
and guerrilla warfare operations. Military presence throughout the whole country allowed 
them to dissuade insurgencies. During the PRI era, the Mexican Armed Forces took 
additional responsibilities. According to Guevaro Moyano, “the Army began 
implementing disaster relief operations as part of its mission portfolio, and participated in 
national vaccination, literacy, nutrition, and forestation campaigns, which created a 
strong bond between the civilian population and the military.”48 Nevertheless, the 
military role has dramatically changed in the last decade, because they have been 
redirected to combat the security threats caused by the transnational criminal 
organizations.49   
This evolution and modernization of the Mexican military has brought U.S. 
Armed Forces and Mexican Armed Forces closer; however, trust issues remain a relevant 
factor as these two cultures try to collaborate to combat the security challenges of the 
twenty-first century. Cultural barriers must be overcome in order to provide the proper 
security cooperation initiatives while producing effective trust-building policies. 
B. CULTURE 
1. Professionalization 
The professionalization of the armed forces is the key to a successful civil-
military relation. Professionalization of the armed forces could be viewed or portrayed 
differently depending upon how the civilian authorities define the roles and 
responsibilities. The professionalization of the forces entails two distinctive capabilities. 
First, it focuses on developing the critical thinking, problem-solving, decision-making, 
and leadership/management competencies through a developmental education process at 
all levels. Second, it concentrates on increasing technical proficiencies of its military 
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members in their specialties or subject of expertise. The cultural tendencies of this 
extremely vertical institution tend to concentrate its efforts in the latter, rather that first 
one. The Mexican Armed Forces are viewed as a very professional institution; however, 
it could increase its ability to effectively produce a more efficient military force. Decision 
making only truly occurs at the higher ranks, producing a stagnant force unable to 
produce effective systematic changes. The delegation of authority and responsibilities is 
limited among the ranks.  
Unlike the U.S. Armed Forces, Mexican non-commissioned officers do not have 
an active role in leadership and decision-making. During a Non-Commissioned Officer 
Academy (NCOA) mobile training team (MTT), conducted by the Inter-American Air 
Forces Academy (IAAFA) at the Heroico Colegio Militar in 2011, the Mexican Armed 
Forces refused to allow non-commissioned officers to attend the course. Instead, they 
selected company grade officers to attend this leadership mobile training course designed 
for non-commissioned officers.50 The professional development of non-commissioned 
officers had been mostly limited to technical aspects of “professionalization.” This 
concept does not make sense as the institution prides itself on the efforts in developing a 
professional transformation in its forces. According to SEDENA,  
The transformation of the Armed Forces is sustained by its Military 
Education System, with its striving for academic perfection, which results 
in efficient operational and logistical capacities in the Army and Air 
Force. In addition, the military revises procedural practices in the troops’ 
military and specialist training building an Army that is each day more 
professional and better prepared in tune with the demands of national 
security.51 
In recent years, the human rights practices of the Mexican military have brought 
negative attention to the institution. With international pressure, the Mexican 
Government has engaged in developing its forces into a more professional institution. 
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During President Felipe Calderon’s administration, professionalization of the 
Mexican military police force, by mirroring its training and development of those in the 
United States and Chile,52 determined that the culture of this institution needed to change. 
However, change was difficult when the institutional culture superseded the real 
necessities of the organization.   
2. Extreme Vertical Culture 
The traditions instilled in the Mexican Armed Forces are an important element to 
understand the way this institution is organized. From the early stages in their military 
development, subordination has been seen as one of the most critical components in its 
structure. An extreme vertical culture of individuals is defined as one who holds the 
essence of a hierarchical organization devoted to comply with the orders presented from 
superiors, regardless of the consequences. In other words, the tendency of accepting the 
actions imposed by higher-level officials, without giving it an ounce of thought or critical 
thinking, and consequently dismissing one’s role and true responsibility to the 
organization and country, is very common in the Mexican Armed Forces. This section 
will attempt to portray the negative effects of the extreme vertical culture in the Mexican 
military. More specifically, we would argue that this phenomenon has caused a 
systematic stagnation of the development of its profession of arms core, both in the 
officer and the non-commissioned officer core, and has also created the platform of an 
ethical dilemma that encourages illegal actions, while increasing the mistrust of citizens, 
public officials, and other international institutions (such as the U.S. Armed Forces). To 
better illustrate the argument, this section will convey the contributing factors for this 
culture, and provide a statement on how it has affected military-to-military relations.    
The first common factor in Mexican military culture is influenced by a deep 
social structure that forces a concrete separation between the enlisted and the 
commissioned officers. It is common that this social struggle unarguably embraces the 
social distinction between the supposed elites (officers) and the apparent unprivileged 
workers (non-commissioned officers (NCO)). The social distinction creates an 
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environment where the least privilege tends to serve the elites at all commands. The 
separation is prevalent at all levels in the hierarchy of the Mexican military; however, it is 
radically more intense when it is between these two social classes (officers and non-
commissioned officers). Like the U.S. military, the respect shown between these officers 
and NCOs is clear; however, the social distinction and separation is completely dissimilar 
to the ones developed by their Mexican counterparts. The U.S. military attempts to 
integrate these two entities. An example of this is the consolidation of Officer and Non-
commissioned Officers clubs within the institutions. Another example is the roles and 
responsibilities of First Sergeants position as the commander’s liaison and advisor on 
administrative issues for all members in an organization (to include commissioned 
officers within a unit). The differences and unfairness in treatment of these two groups 
will create an intense discontent among the ranks. According to the military scholar 
General Jose Francisco Gallardo, “soldiers are also routinely denied access to rights such 
as family and medical leave, while they are forced to work horrendous hours and 
humiliated by their superiors.”53 The economic division between these two classes 
becomes apparent in the infrastructure built to accommodate each of these two groups.    
The second factor influencing this culture is its force formation and development 
programs that continue to inculcate this type of culture. Subordination becomes the norm, 
as is continually evident in the actions taken by all military members through those 
intensive years of military indoctrination. From the very beginning, the intent of school 
formation (basic training–boot camp, as we like to call it in the United States) is to 
transition individuals from a civilian to a military professional. However, the radical 
disciplinary techniques instilled throughout the formation stage, often continue for the 
remainder of the operational and developmental career. Enlisted military are taught to be 
specialists in their technical fields; however, there is no emphasis toward building a 
credible force that engages in critical thinking, problem solving, or more importantly, 
leadership attributes within the organization. Dissent is not only seen as insubordination, 
but disrespect of authority. The U.S. Armed Forces allow and encourage dissent from 
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subordinates, as it is a principle of followership techniques learned throughout their PME 
schools. The developmental education (professional military education) programs barely 
emphasize these critical traits and continue to implement similar radical techniques used 
in the formation schools. There is little room for junior officers and non-commissioned 
officer to fully develop their potential contributions towards this institution, enabling 
them to just follow the orders given without any consciousness about the repercussions or 
truly living by the institutional core values. The extreme vertical culture dominates in a 
Mexican military that continues to evolve into more efficient armed forces.  
There are many negative factors for this type of culture in institutions that require 
a lineal relationship of authority; however, at the same time, there is so much 
responsibility to its citizens. The first negative effect involves the stagnation of the 
professional development programs that are considered the instrument in which a military 
member is molded to a professional of arms. According to the Secretary of National 
Defense (SEDENA) in Mexico, professional military education (PME): 
is a process of physical, mental, and cultural transformation, of men and 
women to get convinced and committed, and to voluntarily surrender the 
country and its institutions for their loyalty, skills, abilities, intelligence, 
and life itself, if necessary, in meeting the duties imposed by the armed 
services.54  
This education is what we refer to as the developmental process of a military 
member within an institution. This process becomes less useful when individuals are not 
given the opportunity to exercise their problem solving, critical thinking, and leadership 
skills. A culture devoted to an extreme lineal hierarchy, especially during this 
developmental process, tends to hinder the ability of the member to retain and use those 
skills. The member must be free to exercise different skills without hierarchical pressure 
due to rank or basic training techniques that are not relevant to this type of development. 
Many Mexican PME programs do not accomplish their intended purpose, due to the lack 
of leadership-based experiential material to which they are exposed. One might think that 
this is a necessary skill as it is explained in detail in many of the military training and 
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educational objectives. These extreme vertical culture becomes a huge road block for 
those who want others to succeed, but the system will not allow it without a commitment 
to educational skills, or by shutting down the opinions of those who wish to speak. 
Roderic Ai Camp highlights that this exaggerated discipline, within article 14 of the 
Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG), emphasizes the reprimand of any actions or intentions 
of individuals who try to go against the school of thought.55 The inability to ensure a 
quality force that identifies itself through institutional values such as patriotism, loyalty, 
service-before-self, and necessary developmental skills (critical thinking, leadership, 
followership, effective dissent, and problem solving), becomes vulnerable to the second 
negative effect of this type of culture.   
Another effect of this culture is its tendency to create an environment where 
defilement of policies within the institution becomes difficult to avoid. It is typical to see 
many commanding officers abusing their authority to mandate their subordinates on tasks 
that are not related to the institution, and are solely for their personal gain. In Mexico, it 
is common to see soldiers washing their commander’s personal vehicle during duty 
hours. This becomes more of an opportunity cost issue within the institutions.  
Citizens are weary of the constant violations of human rights and perceptional 
abuse of governmental power. The arbitrary actions of these groups can be attributed to 
many issues, but the reality is that these activities are endorsed within a culture that has 
failed to recognize the importance of the professional development of all its members, 
and consents to follow orders without measuring the consequences of the clear violations 
they have committed. In 2008, the Mexican Human Rights Commission reported 983 
complaints against the Mexican Armed Forces throughout Calderon’s presidency.56 The 
report also highlighted that “seventy-five percent of these complaints were tied to the 
military’s fight against organized crime.”57 In 2013, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
reported that between January 2007 and mid-November 2012, the National Commission 
on Human Rights in Mexico issued detailed reports on 109 cases in which members of 
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the Army determined that military members—to whom it had delegated mostly fighting 
drug trafficking—had committed serious human rights violations, and received 7,350 
complaints of military abuses.58 Many examples of military abuses and atrocities have 
plagued the Mexican security and defense institutions. Nevertheless, this culture must 
evolve in order to effectively confront the new challenges of the twenty-first century, and 
the internal and international pressures to change.    
The United States Armed Forces need to focus on solutions that require time and 
total commitment through the ranks for these institutions to eradicate an “old-school” of 
thought. For this, a well-established trust-building mechanism must be in place in order 
to better understand and assist the Mexican military. The enlisted must be seen as the 
“backbone” of the military institution, and equal opportunity for professional 
development must be instituted to create an environment of fairness and justice for all 
members within these institutions. The armed forces must restructure their professional 
development programs, reemphasizing the performance of experiential training focused 
in critical thinking, problem solving, leadership, followership, team-building, and the 
ability to produce an effective argument. The armed forces must employ solid formation 
and developmental education institution, to promote an emphasis on ethical institutional 
values, community service, and nationalism. The U.S. military must understand that 
military power is not solely based on capabilities, but on its efficiency and effectiveness 
to operate within its institution. The development of human resources as the most critical 
weapon in the military is what makes this martial institution powerful and trustworthy; 
however, this is easier say than done as we recognize the challenges the Mexican Armed 
Forces faces today.   
C. CHALLENGES OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES 
The Mexican Armed Forces faces several challenges in the twenty-first century. 
These include the continuing development of a professional volunteer force, maintaining 
its legitimacy by prioritizing in human rights and the rule of law, and strengthening 
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defense diplomacy with other governmental and international institutions. These 
challenges must be recognized, but none more than the constitutional challenge it faces 
today. Jose Gallardo describes it by expressing that “the Mexican Armed Forces must 
cease to be the ‘army of the revolution’ and must instead transform into the ‘army of the 
republic.’” 59 The constitutional text of 1917 has limited the Mexican military to evolve 
in synch with the rest of the State entities.60  
A high level of desertion among the lower ranks has also placed the military 
forces in a state of quandary. Trained soldiers have taken over part of the TCO’s fighting 
against the same constitution they once swore to protect. The Zetas—one of the most 
ruthless TCOs in Mexico—take the name of ex-soldiers who join this criminal 
organization. Many experts say that the desertion problems have grown dramatically 
since the militarization in Mexico as the solution to combat the TCOs. Since 2000, an 
average of 16,000 soldiers per year have deserted the Mexican Armed Forces—an 
average of around eight percent per year. In contrast, in 2006, the U.S. Army reported 
approximately 0.65 percent of desertion. There is a lucrative way out for military 
members who feel they can use their military skills in these types of criminal 
organizations. Mexican officials understand how this critical issue affects the military 
institution. Roderic Ai Camp conveys, “It’s part of a larger issue which the military has 
always feared.”61 The Mexican Armed Forces must continue to uphold its ability to 
protect in order to continue to keep itself as one of the most respected institutions in the 
country.62 
Another relevant challenge faced by the Mexican Armed Forces is the internal 
division between the Army, the Navy, and other security coordinating agencies. The lack 
of coordination efforts between the various defense and security entities has halted the 
effectiveness of these institutions. SEMAR and SEDENA are two autonomous ministries 
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whose rivalry in every aspect of the institution (prestige, roles, budget, and authority 
among others) continues to affect joint collaboration between these two institutions. 
According to R. Benitez and A. Sotomayor, the Mexican Armed Forces are the least 
institutionalized with the least civilian control military in Latin America, which in turn, 
hinders the its ability to construct a solid security community.63 From 2008—2010, there 
have only been 10 meetings total among staffs of SEMAR and SEDENA.64  Military 
experts continue to question the interoperability capacity among the Mexican Armed 
Forces. Both ministries are separated and structured differently (see Appendix A and 
B).65 The Mexican President becomes the only central civilian authority between these 
two institutions creating a perception of a weak civilian control and management over the 
Mexican Armed Forces. Nevertheless, there is a focus on bringing the operational 
jointness between these two ministries. Additionally, the new imposed role of internal 
security has mounted additional pressures not only to the military, but also to its civilian 
leadership. As the Mexican military continues to battle these security threats, it also 
increases its visibility for legitimacy among its citizens and the international community.  
The defense budget has also been a topic of challenges within the Mexican Armed 
Forces. Despite the dramatic increase (see Figure 3) in the Mexican defense budget, it 
continues to be topic of uncertainty, as it illustrates a “case of the relationship between 
the unequal access to information and accountability.”66 The Mexican defense budget 
and resources allocated within the different services seems inadequate for the security 
challenges it faces. Therefore, higher competition for these resources becomes a common 
trend between the services.  
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Figure 3.  Mexican Defense Budget67 
The defense budget is appropriated to each ministry as it intends to modernize its 
operational capabilities to combat current and future threats. Mexico has increased its 
UAV capabilities seven times greater than the rest of the LATAM countries. The 
Mexican defense budget since 2006 has increased from .44 percent to .52 percent per 
GDP in 2012. In contrast, the U.S. defense budget is seven times larger than the Mexican 
defense budget.68 Nevertheless, the World Bank also indicates that SEDENA’s military 
budget (relative to the size of its economy) is below 100 countries, including Belize, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Gabon, and Mali. In comparison to the Western 
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region (see Figure 4). Given the internal security threats posed by TCOs, it can be argued 
that there is a lack of military budget allocated to the Mexican Armed Forces as they face 
a critical security role in the country.69      
 
Figure 4.  Defense Budgets in the Western Hemisphere (in Relation to GDP)70 
Furthermore—like its counterpart in the north—each of the services will 
internally allocate their fiscal budget for operations and sustainment. Figure 5 illustrates 
the composition of the Mexican defense budget from 2008 until 2012. The representation 
of the defense budget is unevenly distributed among the different services. More than 60 
percent of the defense budget is allocated to the SEDENA. Close to 80 percent of the 
defense budget is allocated towards salaries and personnel benefits. Yet, the challenges 
described earlier can also be attributed to the budget constraints that continue to haunt 
these institutions. The U.S. military must recognize the Mexican Armed Forces faces in 
                                                 




order to institute a legit security cooperation establishment that is suitable and effective 
for both institutions, regardless of the political or economic conditions.      
 
Figure 5.  Defense Budget Breakdown71 
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite the historical emphasis, cultural barriers, and the challenges faced by the 
Mexican Armed Forces, the conditions in which this institution has evolved is placed 
directly between the civil-military relations established throughout its creation. This 
section presented an historical background of the Mexican Armed Forces, to include its 
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profound civil-military relation, and the evolution and transformation of the force. 
Additionally, it elaborated cultural differences, in particular, the professionalization 
efforts compared to the U.S. Armed Forces, and an extreme vertical culture that continues 
to challenge the development of an efficient institution. Finally, the discussion of the 
professionalization, defense structure and joint collaboration, and budget challenges that 
the Mexican military faces in the beginning of this century, help us better understand and 
appreciate an institution that has been caught in the middle of a rollercoaster of bilateral 
relations between these two countries.   
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III. UNITED STATES–MEXICO MILITARY RELATIONS 
This chapter presents an historical background of the U.S.-Mexico military 
relations during critical historical events, and assesses the conditions in which the 
Mexican military continues to be reluctant to establish a collaborative relationship with 
its Northern neighbor. It analyzes military-to-military engagements and sentiments during 
the Mexican-American War, post-revolutionary engagements, WWII, the Cold War, and 
post 9/11. It also argues that the military-to-military cooperation between Mexico and the 
United States has been based on security threats and economic interests, but with the 
constant denominator “distrust.” This chapter also examines the BPC process, 
USNORTHCOM strategies, and policies toward security cooperation in Mexico, and 
presents a statistical analysis of the security cooperation efforts, through International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) data. Finally, it argues that the building 
partnership capacity initiatives continue to focus on current security needs, rather than as 
trust-building alternatives that will build the pillars of a strong military relation. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S.-MEXICAN MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
During the past two centuries, U.S.-Mexico relations have been a rollercoaster of 
conflict and cooperation. Until 1940, a continuous divergence had best described the 
relationship between these two nations. According to Jorge Dominguez, “this image of 
bilateral conflict long held sway, consequently, as the most likely style for their 
relation.”72 While the United States often pursued its expansionist and economic policies 
through military means, Mexico was the country in Latin America most affected by the 
U.S. expansionist policies. The most evident example of this was the Mexican-American 
War 1846–1848, which marked the beginning of a rocky relationship between these two 
military institutions.73    
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1. The Mexican-American War  
The Mexican American War was an historical event that would eventually change 
the cultural mindset of the Mexican military towards its Northern neighbors. Guided by 
the “Manifest Destiny,” (the concept in which the United States had the moral obligation 
to expand its territory to the Pacific Coast), U.S. President James Polk offered to 
purchase New Mexico and California from Mexico, and argued that the Rio Grande River 
was the border between the two countries. Additionally, President Polk argued that 
General Santa Anna had ceded this territory after the Texans captured him during the 
Battle of San Jacinto in 1836. The Mexican government refused Polk's offer, and in 
retaliation, Polk sent General Zachary Taylor to Corpus Christi to establish a military 
fort. The Mexican government considered these actions an act of war. On April 24, 1846, 
a clash occurred between the Taylor forces and Mexican Army of the North, followed by 
a full-scale U.S. invasion. Polk’s hostility towards Mexico was evident because he had 
already planned to go to war with Mexico before this incident; however, the war took an 
unprecedented turn when the U.S. forces arrived in Mexico City in the famous Battle of 
Chapultepec on September 13, 1847.74 Figure 6 displays the different battles during the 
Mexican-American War. 
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Figure 6.  The Mexican American War75 
The Mexican-American War was in its final chapter when the U.S. forces 
advanced toward the Chapultepec Castle to topple the last Mexican resistance that was 
defending this fort. Prior to the war, this fort was the home to their military training 
academy. When the battle started, several Mexican cadets were involved in this conflict. 
Against the orders of General Nicolas Bravo, who ordered the cadets to retreat to safety, 
six young cadets refused to relinquish their post, and fought the Americans until the end. 
This act of patriotism echoed throughout the entire country and brought a sense of 
nationalism. The sacrifice of the Niños Héroes (heroic children) has been forever 
engraved into Mexico’s history, particularly in its military culture. The naming of their 
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future military academy, Heroico Colegio Militar (HCM), is influenced by the historical 
significance of the cadets’ actions in projecting loyalty, self-sacrifice, and their 
indiscriminate service to their nation.76 
Two years later after the seizure of Mexico City, the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo formally ended the Mexican-American War. The treaty obligated Mexico to 
yield more the 500,000 square mile of valuable territory, which is present-day California, 
Arizona, New Mexico, and parts of Colorado and Nevada. The treaty also mandated the 
United States to pay $15 million in compensation for war-related damages to Mexico. 
According to Dominguez,  
The heavy human, territorial, and economic toll of the war alarmed the 
nation, then on the brink of disintegration. Mexico’s attitude henceforth 
would be marked with distrust toward is northern neighbor. The United 
States became a catalyst for Mexican nationalism.77 
The resentment caused by the consequences of the Mexican-American War is 
present in many Mexicans today, but in particular, within the military ranks. Cadets in the 
HCM are often reminded of the heroic acts of the Niños Héroes during the U.S. invasion 
in 1847. The HCM has become a symbol of the patriotic acts against U.S. supremacy.78 
The name for this conflict offered a clue to the sensibilities between both countries. The 
arrival of U.S. General Winfield Scott in Mexico City was also a critical point in history, 
which the Mexicans continue to resent. The U.S flag was raised in the Mexican National 
Palace (see Figure 7). In the United States, this conflict was referred to as the “Mexican-
American War,” but in Mexico, was defined as the “War of the North American 
Invasion.”79 
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Figure 7.  U.S. Troops in Mexico City80 
After the Mexican-American War, U.S.-Mexico relations became more stable. 
Despite economic relations that favored both countries during the Porfirio Diaz Regime 
and U.S. administration of President Rutherford Hayes, the bilateral cooperation between 
the military institutions was distant. Nevertheless, the economic progress of the Diaz era 
had its cost. The elites and wealthy prospered, while the vast majority of the Mexicans 
faced extraordinary poverty. Rebels against this social injustice took advantage of the 
current conditions to revolt against the Mexican government. The Mexican Revolution of 
1910 would spark the beginning of a dense and complicated relationship between the 
United States and Mexico.81   
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2. U.S. Intervention in Veracruz  
In 1913, General Victoriano Huerta killed President Francisco Madero during a 
coup attempt. The United States worried that Huerta could not maintain order or protect 
the Americans and their private properties in Mexico. In April 1914, the Mexican Army 
detained nine American soldiers for allegedly entering a fueling station in Tampico. 
Admiral Fletcher pressed for an immediate intervention in Veracruz under his command. 
Under the pretext of stopping a German ship (Ypiranga) that was carrying weapons to the 
Hueristas, President Woodrow Wilson sent U.S. Marines to the port of Veracruz to seize 
this key location. On April 21, U.S. battleships bombarded the city for hours, while the 
civilian populace battled against the American occupation. Figure 8 shows an image of 
U.S. vessels arriving in the port of Veracruz. Despite the Huerta’s army resistance, the 
U.S. Marines were able to control the port of Veracruz within hours. Hence, the 
American forces occupied Veracruz for almost seven months, seizing extensive amount 
of weapons from Mexicans.82 
                                                 
82 John M. Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), 305–308.  
 39 
 
Figure 8.  U.S. Navy ships arriving in Veracruz in 1914 83 
The 6,000 forces who stormed the port of Veracruz on the morning of April 21, 
1914, were not only fighting against Huerta’s Constitutional army, but the will of the 
people of Veracruz and the cadets of the Naval Academy in the heart of this port. 
According to SEMAR, naval cadets did not care for their lives while pledging their 
dedication to service and military values of honor, loyalty, and a strong love for their 
country. The invasion inflamed anti-American sentiment in Mexico, and later defined the 
cultural enigma in the birth of a rivalry between these two nations. In honor of the 
courage demonstrated by the cadets during this historic event, the 1949 Mexican 
Congress changed the name of the Mexican Naval Academy to the Heroica Escuela 
Naval Militar (Heroic Naval Military Academy). Like its army counterpart, the Mexican 
Naval Academy was named after the heroic acts of Mexican cadets against U.S. Armed 
forces. The U.S. intervention in Veracruz and the acts of valor by the Mexican people—
especially by the naval cadets—were fully embedded throughout the formation of all 
Mexican naval officers. According to Craig Deare, “the officer corps of the Army and the 
Navy have been deeply ingrained into their professional ethos through the truth and 
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myths of the attacks on their homeland by the invaders from the north.”84 Figure 9 shows 
the image of U.S. Marines raising the flag at the port of Veracruz, continuing to pour 
more salt in the wound. After the Mexican Revolution, both governments attempted to 
better their relations. Nevertheless, other historical events forced bilateral cooperation 
between these two military institutions.85    
 
Figure 9.  U.S. Marines raising the flag in Veracruz in 191486 
3. U.S.-Mexico Relations During WWII 
During WWII, U.S.-Mexico military relations became relevant, and for the first 
time, security cooperation became a critical factor in national security between these two 
nations. In the late 1930s, the United States shifted the focus of its strategic policies 
towards the defense of the whole continent. To satisfy national security concerns, both 
countries saw the need to commence bilateral military cooperation. The emergence of 
global threats, such as Hitler’s aggressive move in Europe and the Spanish Civil War, 
forced the United States to reshape its relations with Latin America, particularly with 
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Mexico. These events forced the United States to address its differences with Mexico. 
The U.S. assumptions of Mexico’s lack of commitment to democracy, and Mexico’s 
wariness of a covert U.S. imperialistic agenda, continued to mount certain distrust 
between them.87   
Despite this distrust, both countries started to cooperate on defense issues. The 
United States began to play a more committed diplomacy role with their Southern 
neighbors. An example of these actions was when “President Harry S. Truman became 
the first U.S. President to visit Mexico City, laying a wreath at the foot of the U.S.-
Mexican war monument to the Niños Héroes.”88 This type of political maneuver was 
indicative of the importance of bilateral collaboration during this period for the United 
States. After recognizing the strategic importance of the stability of the Latin American 
countries, and the possible influence of German propaganda in Mexico, the United States 
felt the importance to win Mexican trust by supporting a hemispheric defense 
negotiation. This new strategy dictates that the U.S. would now provide the necessary 
means to support Mexico so that it could defend itself against any foreign attack or 
domestic disorder. The United States felt this was an opportunity to close the bilateral 
gaps with Mexico. Despite U.S. efforts to engage in defense cooperation with Mexico, 
the Mexican government remained closed to military cooperation until 1941, when the 
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Not until then, did the Mexican government decide to 
enter a military alliance with the United States against Axis Alliance.89 
According to Garza, the height of military alliance between Mexico and the 
United States occurred in WWII from 1941 to 1945. After the Mexican tanker Potrero 
del Llano was sunk by a German U-boat in 1941, Mexico decided to join the Allies in an 
effort to neutralize the common threat. In 1942, official cooperation between these two 
entities was institutionalized. The creation of the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense 
commission was established with the purpose “to study problems relating to the common 
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defense of the United States and Mexico, to consider broad plans for the defense of 
Mexico and adjacent areas of the United States, and to propose to the perspective 
governments the cooperative measures which, in its opinion should be adopted.”90 The 
increased defense cooperation between the United States and Mexico allowed the U.S. 
military to operate in Mexican territory under several restrictions.91 Garza best explains,  
During this time, Mexico—for the first time—made several military 
concessions to the United States For instance, overflying agreements were 
reached and U.S. aircraft were allowed to land at Mexican airfields on 
their way to Panama. Several radar systems were also established on 
Mexican territory. Perhaps the most important concession by the Mexican 
government was to allow a limited number of U.S. military personnel on 
Mexican soil (in most cases, U.S. military personnel had to wear civilian 
attire). Despite these concessions, Mexico rejected the establishment of 
U.S. military bases on its territory and the possibility of a joint military 
command because these implied the deployment of U.S. troops to Mexico 
and the possible subordination of the Mexican Army to a U.S. officer.92 
During this period, the U.S. military conducted training and exercises with their southern 
counterparts. This period marked the greatest defense cooperation in the history of both 
countries.     
After WWII, a new style of bilateral relations reigned until the 1980s. According 
to Dominguez, Mexico and the United States “deliberately or inadvertently invested little 
effort in improving the quality of bilateral relations or deepening the opportunities for 
institutional collaboration.”93 This style of cooperation projected what would become the 
norm, and the estrangement between these two military institutions throughout an 
important historical event in U.S. history: the Cold War. 
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4. U.S.-Mexico Relations During the Cold War 
During the Cold War, bilateral defense relations became stagnant. The strategic 
view of traditional armies was no longer relevant as a deterrent force during this period. 
Nuclear weapons were the main factor to consider. The Cold War had more of an 
ideological emphasis, which was concentrated in the counterbalance of Communism, not 
only in Latin American, but also in the rest of the world. The United States viewed 
countries in the Western Hemisphere, in particular Mexico, as allies against this new 
threat. Foreign policies between these two countries were based on “bargained 
negligence,”94 as they intended to ignore each other. Despite the common external threats 
both countries faced, they failed to develop a strategic alliance that could help them 
collaborate at the political and military level against these tribulations.95 
Consequently, military relations between Mexico and the United States were 
diluted, as both faced a limited economic interdependency and an inactive foreign policy. 
Mexico collaborated as little as possible with the United States, while the country sought 
to avoid political confrontations with its northern neighbor. Mexico was the only country 
in Latin America that did not display any efforts in building military relations with the 
United States. According to Dominguez,  
Mexico did not support most U.S. military policies in the multilateral 
institutions of the Western Hemisphere from the 1950s through the 1980s, 
nor did it construct bilateral institutions for security collaboration with the 
United States to combat crime, guerrillas, or communist threats.96  
There was minimal communication between these two military entities. Once 
again, the historical and geopolitical conditions deteriorated the bilateral military 
relations.97   
David Mares best summarizes the U.S.-Mexico relations during the Cold War as 
follows:    
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While Mexico’s grand strategy has focused on its northern neighbor, the 
United States has only sporadically viewed Mexico as relevant to its grand 
strategy. During the early 1970s, first the drug trade and then political 
instability in Mexico stirred minor U.S. interest in rethinking the 
relationship with Mexico. That interest increased during the late 1970s, as 
Mexico’s oil and gas industries boomed, international energy markets 
tightened, and the Central American foreign policies of the two countries 
increasingly diverged. Whether in energy markets or in Central America, 
however, Mexico remained a relatively minor irritant to a U.S. 
government more concerned about challenges from the oil producers’ 
cartel (of which Mexico was not a member), the Soviet Union, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the U.S. Congress.98 
A relationship based on indifference changed briefly to conflict during the Ronald 
Reagan and Miguel de la Madrid administrations in the 1980s. The death of a U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent in Mexico became the source of tension 
between these two administrations. The U.S. government blamed Mexican government 
officials for involvement and for the lack of security. This highly publicized incident 
continued to deteriorate the bilateral military relations, and raised questions regarding the 
legitimacy and ability of the Mexican government. Consequently, the relations would 
take a different direction during the democratization of Mexico in the new millennium.99  
5. U.S.-Mexico Military Relations Post 9/11  
Mexico’s leap to democratization in 2000 brought many hopes to the bilateral 
defense cooperation between these two countries. The poorly defined reforms, in 
conjunction with weak governmental institutions in Mexico, allowed criminal 
organizations to expand their businesses, and control larger territories in Mexico.100 In 
2001, President Vicente Fox and President George W. Bush pledged to collaborate in 
migration, energy, and security issues, and sought to start a new chapter of bilateral  
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cooperation. The expectations for improved relations were raised by both sides; however, 
the tragic events of September 11, 2001 changed political and security environments 
between these two nations.101  
The need to establish a national security structure was eminent. In response to the 
actual and perceived threats, the United States created the Department of Homeland 
Security and the USNORTHCOM. According to Deare, “many bilateral issues were 
‘securitized’—in particular, the key issues of free trade and migration—reigniting 
tensions between the two neighbors.”102 The formation of USNORTHCOM also brought 
new concerns for the Mexican military. In the past, Mexican military authority had a 
direct line to the OSD, the Joint Staff, and all individual services. Furthermore, its limited 
security assistance fund, which was controlled and managed by USSOUTHCOM, was 
now under a new command that was inexperienced in security cooperation. The Mexican 
military authorities showed their discontent and highlighted their objection of the new 
defense structural reforms in the U.S. These institutional reforms created some obstacles 
in bilateral cooperation.103   
In his thesis based on several interviews, Jeffrey Burkett noted open sources and 
literature that emphasized bilateral collaboration between the U.S.-Mexico defense 
cooperation levels, and were categorized in the lower end of the cooperation spectrum 
throughout the mid-2000s. He also indicated that, “given that defense and security 
missions overlap bi-nationally, the ideal level of military cooperation includes the 
coordination of planning efforts that address common issues that have a defense 
nexus.”104 Figure 10 highlights the different levels of military cooperation and points out 
the current level and desired level these institutions must reach.105 
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Figure 10.  Spectrum of U.S. Mexico Levels of Defense Cooperation106 
There are other positive consequences to these institutional security reforms, 
along with other events that jump-started the defense collaborations. In 2005, a 
cooperative venture between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, called the Security 
and Prosperity Partnership of North America, brought a new light to economic 
opportunities and the prevention and response to security threats in the North American 
continent. The goals of this trilateral cooperation initiative “created a nexus between 
USNORTHCOM, the Mexican military, and our interagency partners.”107 The symbolic 
support of the Mexican military during Hurricane Katrina marked the beginning of 
bilateral defense cooperation between these two nations. Furthermore, President Felipe 
Calderón published a national strategy directing greater cooperation between these two 
institutions, marking a transcendental moment in bilateral military affairs.  
President Calderon’s efforts to realign Mexico’s security cooperation initiatives 
with the United States, led to the development of a U.S. assistance package to Mexico to 
combat drug trafficking and organized crime. In 2008, the Mérida Initiative took effect as 
it was originally created to: “1) break the power and impunity of criminal of criminal 
organizations; 2) strengthen border, air, and maritime controls; 3) improve the capacity of 
justice systems in the region; and 4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug 
demand.”108 The first part of this initiative was primarily focused on increasing the 
technological capabilities to confront these issues. Consequently, the strategy focus 
changed to equipping and training. Finally, during the Obama administration the focus 
became institution-building, while enhancing economic development and community-
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based social programs. The U.S. Congress appropriated more than $2.1 billion for 
Mexico under this initiative from FY2008 to FY2013, of which $1.3 billion has been 
handed over.109 Despite Department of State (DOS) management of this program, the 
U.S. military has played a key role in the execution of funds. The Mérida Initiative has 
become a critical component to the establishment of a stronger military relation between 
these two nations in the past five years.110  
 
Table 1.   FY08–FY14 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and 
Appropriations Measure111 
The current military relations under President Peña-Nieto continue to evolve, 
however, the security reforms that affect U.S.-Mexico cooperation under the Mérida 
Initiate have yet to be announced. Nevertheless, Peña Nieto has pledged to continue U.S.-
Mexican security cooperation, although with more emphasis on reducing the violence in 
Mexico.112 Recent leaks of sensitive U.S. information have altered the bilateral 
cooperation. Consequently, the President Peña Nieto administration appears more 
suspicious of overt U.S. involvement in security operations in Mexico than with the 
previous government. Additionally, after the presumed release of U.S. government 
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spying on Mexican government officials, several steps were taken to tighten up the 
accessibility of U.S. military members in Mexico. According to Clare Ribando Seelke, 
“the Mexican government notified U.S. agencies operating in Mexico that Internal 
Ministry will be the approving authority on all requests for new Mérida-funded training 
or equipment made by Mexican government entities.”113 Previous and ongoing programs 
were not affected by this new policy, and bilateral military cooperation has expanded. 
The U.S. Army Major General Francis G. Mahon—NORTHCOM’s Director for 
Strategy, Plans, and Policy—conveys, “during the past two to three years, as the Mexican 
Army and Mexican Navy have taken on a larger role beyond internal security issues, our 
relationship with them has really grown and expanded through security cooperation.”114 
Both administrations continue to advocate bilateral engagements that would help cease 
the violence in Mexico.115   
Despite the increase in military-to-military collaboration in the past few years, 
some scholars continue to emphasize a sense of distrust that pervades these two 
institutions. According to Paz,  
Today the problems are different; drugs and illegal immigration have 
supplanted the Axis as the major threat, but curiously enough, the attitudes 
of both countries are still the same. The United States regards its neighbor 
with suspicion and remains unwilling to share intelligence with the 
Mexican authorities because it is concerned with the possibilities of leaks 
and corruption. Mexico, on the other hand, fears domination by its 
neighbor. In the eyes of most Mexican people, the prospect of joint 
military exercises remains to this day a source of considerable unease. 
Overcoming this distrust and fear is a challenge for the future.116  
Other scholars also believe that distrust is the key component that prevents 
governments from establishing policies and programs that can close the gap between 
these two institutions. Some key questions remain, if indeed the bilateral collaboration 
between these two institutions is set for the long haul. Are the security cooperation 
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initiatives bridging the gap of distrust between both entities? Are the BPC mechanisms 
used by DOD, USNORTHCOM, and the Security Cooperation Office (SCO) forging an 
enduring partnership based on trust, and not solely on needs? To answer these questions, 
we must analyze the prior and current strategies and policies concerning security 
cooperation initiatives with Mexico.  
B. ANALYZING U.S. STRATEGIES/POLICIES  
In an environment where military members are obliged to establish diplomatic 
relations and direct engagement with partner nations, future leaders analyzing U.S. 
strategic policies toward military engagements with Mexico is crucial. This section will 
attempt to explain the defense assistance programs currently in place, and the role of the 
different entities (DSCA, USNORTHCOM, and SCO) involved in this process. 
Furthermore, this section will evaluate the effectiveness of the International Military 
Training Education (IMET) program towards building an enduring and trustworthy 
defense relationship. Finally, this section will identify areas for improving a trust-
building mechanism, after analyzing the historical background of U.S.-Mexico military 
relations. 
1. Military Assistance Programs to Mexico 
The U.S. Security Assistance program plays a critical role in the bilateral 
cooperation efforts between the United States and Mexico. The U.S. Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and the Annual Appropriations Acts 
for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program authorize security 
assistance to partner nations.117 These programs provide the platform to assist in the 
development of Mexico’s institutional and defense capacities. It includes grants for 
military training, education, and equipment. The Department of State manages these 
programs; however, most of these are implemented and executed by the Department of 
Defense. The different types of security assistance programs are labeled in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11.   United States Military Assistance Programs to Mexico118 
The counter-narcotics and terrorism programs are managed by other entities 
within the government, but the U.S. Armed Forces can implement any of these. These 
programs are budgeted and restricted to support specific objectives within the security 
assistance realm. For example, the type of training and equipment authorized in the 
counter-narcotic programs could only be tied to the assistance in those particular areas. 
Nevertheless, IMET becomes crucial in the security cooperation strategy, as it intends to 
be the most influential tool for DOD to establish stronger relations with their Southern 
counterparts. Other programs such as the foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military 
financing (FMF), and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) are also 
programs that are executed through the U.S. armed forces. Still, one of the most 
important programs the military operate is IMET.  
As established in the Security Assistance Management Manuel, IMET’s objective 
is to “encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding 
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between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of 
international peace and security; develop rapport, understanding, and communication 
links; develop host nation training self-sufficiency; improve host nation ability to manage 
its defense establishment; and develop skills to operate and maintain U.S.-origin 
equipment.”119 It has truly become the most essential apparatus in DOD’s arsenal for 
educating and training the partner nations’ military for future leaders. According to 
Richard Grimmet, a specialist in national defense, “IMET may also be the only 
instrument available that might assist in changing the attitudes of military-dominated 
governments and lead to the reaction in human rights abuses and greater levels of 
democratic government.”120 This will also be true in Mexico, even though it is not a 
military-dominated government.   
IMET is divided into PME and specialized technical training. PME provides the 
foundation for a professional force that has the capacity to lead their organizations in the 
future. Both areas are critical in the professional development of a military member; 
however, PME schools provide the most effective ways to expose American values, and 
produce competent leaders with a better understanding of U.S. policies. PME programs 
are one of the most valuable tools in supporting U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. 
Department of State denotes that the exposure of American values, military doctrine, and 
combined military-to-military exercises facilitates interoperability and future 
engagements with coalition forces.121   
Since 2008, the budget for security cooperation has almost quadrupled. 
Calderon’s strategy against organized crime, and his pledge to collaborate with President 
Obama on security and the war against drugs, has indeed boosted the assistance Mexico 
receives from the U.S. government. In retrospective, the funds for IMET have only 
slightly doubled. This means that most of the budget for security assistance programs has 
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been allocated to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism activities. On the other hand, 
from 2008 to 2012, almost 65 percent of the Mexican students attending IMET-funded 
courses are not in PME programs. Table 2 displays the IMET assistance to Mexico from 
FY08 to FY12, in comparison with the rest of the military assistance programs. This table 
also highlights the percentage of PME students within the IMET program for those same 
years.122  
 
Table 2.   International Military Education & Training Assistance to Mexico123 
PME is also an important program that helps to develop common understanding 
among allies. Unfortunately, this emphasis has not been the case with Mexico. In 2008, 
two Mexican cadets participated in officer formation schools through the exchange 
program. One Mexican cadet attended the U.S. Naval Academy, and another attended the 
U.S. Air Force Academy. It was not until 2012 that four Mexican cadets attended West 
Point.124 No U.S. Armed Forces member has attended any of the Mexican military 
academies or PME schools. The fact that the exchange program is not working as it 
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should brings many questions to bear. One of them is whether there is a true desire for 
collaboration on both sides, and if the process is working to accomplish its intended 
objective. For this, we must first analyze the IMET process and the roles, responsibilities, 
strategy, and policies of the players involved.  
2. Understanding the Building Partnership Capacity Process 
Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) programs provides policy and procedures 
for execution of security cooperation and assistance activities that are funded by the U.S. 
government in efforts to build partner nations capabilities by enhancing security forces 
capacities in counterinsurgency, counter-drugs, counterterrorism, or to support U.S. 
military and stability operations, or multinational peacekeeping operations. BPC is 
paramount for achieving national security objectives. BPC performs as a management 
system of key components that establish a process for providing security assistance to 
partner nations. The BPC case process is organized into five different phases (see Figure 
12).  
 
Figure 12.  Building Partnership Capacity Process 
The first phase of the BPC process is the planning and requirement definition. 
According to the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) in this initial phase, 
“the USG Requesting Authority, which is usually the Geographical Combatant Command 
(CCMD), but could also be another DOD or non-DOD agency, defines and initiates the 
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BPC requirement to support specific USG objectives.” 125 Laying down the foundation of 
the type of assistance the combatant commander values toward that particular country is 
important to highlight throughout this process. The implementing agency (IA) can 
perform an evaluation to determine the most suitable solution for this requirement. Then, 
the U.S. government (USG) requesting authority then submits an actionable letter of 
request to the IA. This phase initiates the formal request of the BPC process.126  
During the second phase, Case Development, the IA and the requesting authority 
produce a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) that includes all the requirements and the 
expenses. Additionally, “the DSCA Case Writing Division (CWD) conducts a quality 
assurance review, prepares the final version of the LOA, and coordinates review and 
approval by DSCA and DOS.”127 Coordination of the specifics components for this 
request is paramount to ensure the services and/or defense article meet the USG 
objectives. Finally, the IA prepares a document that informs our partner nation of U.S. 
expectations in the fulfillment of this request.  
During the third phase, case implementation, the IA accepts the offer in an 
automated system and DSCA authorizes the funds to be transferred to provide the service 
and/or defense article. Finally, the Defense Finance Accounting Service implements the 
case and gives the obligation authority to the IA. The IA is now authorized to use 
appropriate funds to provide the security assistance to the benefiting country. Ongoing 
coordination between the IA and the Security Cooperation Office (SCO) is critical in 
identifying the procedures for execution.128  
The fourth phase is the case execution. The IA procures the defense articles and 
services according to DOD regulations. The IA retains oversight of the transportation 
process and provides assistance with any logistical issues. “After materiel has arrived in 
country and has been inventoried, the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) transfers 
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custody and responsibility of the materiel and services to the Benefitting Country and 
begins end use monitoring (EUM), as applicable.”129 During this phase, it is critical that 
the IA obligate the funds before they expired. The IA must deliver and meet the 
requirements set during the initial phase.130 
The Final phase, case closure, will start as soon as the services and/or material 
have been delivered. The case closure identifies the security assistance to the benefitting 
country as complete. The IA must ensure that residual funds are identified for return as 
soon as possible. When closure activities are complete, USG will then proceed to close 
the case. Most of the time the IA will develop a final report and/or assessment for the 
requesting authority to identify lessons learned and address if the required objectives 
were met.131  
IMET is conducted under the BPC process, which provides a thorough 
explanation of the roles and responsibilities for all the actors involved. To better analyze 
where in the process issues exist, we must understand the three most critical actors in this 
process. An analysis of their strategic guidance and their roles and responsibilities are 
crucial in the development of policies that will enable them to build solid cooperation 
initiatives.  
3. Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) denotes the specific 
responsibility of DSCA in the BPC process, as the administrator under the direction of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Plans and Policy), and guides DOD components and 
SCOs on the administration and execution of BPC program activities. “DSCA oversees 
program-level logistics planning, provides financial management, develops and 
implements program policies, and otherwise assists Requesting Authorities in 
achievement of BPC program objectives.”132 The role of DSCA plays an important role 






in this process, but it is limited in the tactical and operation decision made by the 
combatant commanders and the SCO when engaging directly with the benefitting nation. 
It certainly establishes the rules and guidance on how the funding is utilized and approves 
the initial request from the requesting authority. From a BPC perspective, DSCA plays 
more of an administrator role rather than a strategist or planner on how the security 
assistance will be provided to the partner nation. Nevertheless, it is an important element 
in the administrative function within this process.    
4. U.S. Northern Command 
After the tragic event of September 11, 2001, the USG had to make some radical 
internal changes in order to reestablish the security confidence of its citizens. In 2002, 
DOD announced the creation of USNORTCHOM with the purpose was to unify different 
organizations that have focused on homeland defense and civil support missions. 
USNORTHCOM current mission is to “conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the 
United States and its interests.”133 This mission is quite different from the rest of the 
geographic unified commands. However, an emphasis of cooperative defense structure 
with Canada and Mexico is crucial to achieve this end state. Nevertheless, it identifies the 
‘homeland defense’ as the key obligation in its area of responsibility (AOR). Figure 13 
represents the key areas for USNORTHCOM. Likewise, USNORTHCOM stated vision 
is “With our trusted partners, we will defend North America by outpacing all threats, 
maintaining faith with our people and supporting them in their times of greatest need.”134 
The words “trusted partners” are important because they identify a strategy that continues 
to build trustworthiness.135    
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Figure 13.  USNORTHCOM Sacred Areas136 
After its initiation, USNORTHCOM became overwhelmed with homeland 
defense initiatives, and plainly disregarded the securing partnership role. As Deare 
explains, for the first few years of its existence, USNORTHCOM heavily focused in its 
primary mission, the internal defense of the U.S. national territory.137 The deteriorating 
security issues that Mexico faced in the last decade led to a stronger collaboration of 
USNORTHCOM with its southern allies. During President Calderon’s administration, the 
security assistance between the Mexican and U.S. militaries was at its highest. 
Nevertheless, in the past few years, USNORTHCOM has been committed to continue to 
raise the security cooperation efforts with the Mexican Armed Forces. The commander’s 
priorities have also changed since USNORTHCOM was created. One of the 
commander’s priorities involves expanding and strengthening our trusted partnerships. 
This priority is unique, as it focuses on building the capacity through the BPC process.  
USNORTHCOM is responsible for a “multi-year planning of BPC activities and 
strategies for the regions and countries within its theater of operations, documented in the 
Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP).”138 This plan supports the commander’s 
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goals and objectives for regional security. Throughout this BPC process, NORTHCOM 
becomes the strategic guidance regarding in which areas to focus for the security 
cooperation realm. Additionally, NORTHCOM is responsible for prioritizing, 
coordinating, and evaluating the success of security cooperation activities in Mexico. 
NORTHCOM priorities are the pillars in which the requesting authority must perform. A 
thorough evaluation is necessary not only to identify the areas for improvement, but also 
to assess if the proper strategy is used towards Mexico. NORTHCOM will depend upon 
the SCO to drive the commander’s priorities through initiatives that meet the overall 
objectives.139  
5. Security Cooperation Office 
The security cooperation office (SCO) has become one of the most critical 
elements in this building capacity process. Many times, the SCO is the requesting 
authority after taking into consideration the marching BPC strategies from 
USNORTHCOM. When the security cooperation office is not the primary requesting 
authority, they support the requesting authority throughout the whole process. The SCO 
also interacts closely with both Mexican military ministries. According to the SAMM, 
“the SCO is entrusted with communicating BPC program objectives and requirements to 
Benefitting Country representatives and soliciting their partnership, ...[and] is also 
familiar with the in-country security and logistics environment.”140 Security cooperation 
officers must have a diplomatic charisma to ensure that national objectives are met. At 
the same time, it must coordinate all the training requirements established by the Mexican 
Armed Forces to initiate this BPC process.141  
The SCO in Mexico is the link between the Mexican Armed Forces and the U.S. 
military. For the most part, they are the bread-and-butter of the security cooperation 
initiatives; however, they are consumed by the realities of a defense relation that 
continues to struggle in building trust. The SCO has a lot of influence on the type of 





security assistance provided to the Mexican Armed Forces. Their constant engagements 
with the Mexican military make them the tip of the arrow for capacity building and 
military engagements. It is one of the most important responsibilities in the BPC process, 
as it intends to convey the USG national interests. It is a vital organization in the country 
team as it also plays a military advisory role at the embassy. It is important to analyze 
how the current BPC process, along with the strategies and policies, will not work to 
shape a trusting relationship between these two forces.  
6. Theoretical Trustbuilding Approaches 
Studies in trust-building approaches between two or more institutions are relevant 
to the discussion of this thesis. As “trust” becomes the fundamental condition in which 
both entities depend on to advance each other’s interests, several considerations must be 
taken to understand the trust-building process.142 We must first identify root causes of 
this problem, and then acknowledge the need of a systematic process to develop trust 
between both organizations. A five-step exchange relationship approach and a three-step 
approach are analyzed to look at the fundamental areas that can potentially help the U.S. 
armed forces recognize a sound strategy for trust building.  
Helbert C. Kelman identifies a trust-building approach between enemies as a 
possible solution for a conflicting relationship. The exchange relationship, “trust,” 
becomes the overarching extension of these organizations in order to make the 
relationship work. Nevertheless, Kelman points out that the relationship must be 
reciprocal. Through Malik’s work, Kelman highlights that, “to build a relationship of 
mutual trust, managers must extend trust to their subordinates, and they must earn the 
trust of their subordinates by their own trustworthy behavior.”143 Kelman uses an 
interacting problem-solving approach, where he uses a third party to the resolution of 
international conflicts. Social and psychological principals also anchor this interactive 
workshop approach—pioneered by John Burton. A third party through this interactive 
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process handles the dilemma of trust building by trying to present possible micro-level 
solutions, while transitioning to the macro-level. The five concepts related in this trust-
building approach are: 1) successive approximations of commitment and reassurance; 2) 
using a third party as a repository of trust; 3) working trust; 4) identifying the uneasy 
coalition; and 5) establishing mutual reassurance.144 Although, this approach focuses on a 
peace-building process, it surely can become an important approach for trust building 
between both Armed Forces. The establishment of a North American Defense council 
can perhaps bring our Canadian counter-parts to facilitate in this trust-building 
approach.145   
Another relevant trust-building concept targets three different areas in an 
organization. These have to be looked at closely to truly understand how strategies 
toward building capacity are intertwined with “trust.” According to the three areas in an 
organization that are key for building trust and sustaining it through a long period of time 
are leaders, structure, and culture.146 Organizations must be committed as they reflect 
integrity, concerns, and results that can be quantified and demonstrated through bilateral 
actions. The foundation of this process must come from the leaders in order to establish a 
well-founded trust-building strategy. The development of leaders is essential for “trust” 
to exist. Once this is done, the structure and culture of an organization can be more easily 
established for trust-building mechanisms.147  
C. WHAT ARE WE DOING WRONG?  
Building partnership capacity is always a challenge for U.S. government. 
Building trust, and the mechanism that an institution must commit, is difficult. When 
analyzing the context in which the international military training is based, we must 
recognize that funding becomes a showstopper in some security assistance initiatives. 
The U.S.-Mexico economic, cultural, and security interdependences should provide the 
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notion that it must be one of our most important strategic allies in the world; however, it 
does not appear that way. In the early years of USNORTHCOM, there was no sense of 
urgency to identify the importance of Mexico to the U.S. and the military relations. 
According to Dr. Downie, “our policy has not demonstrated the necessary level of 
urgency, or the emphasis to highlight that our combined efforts are necessary to 
successfully confront the ominous challenge of transnational crime.”148 Improving U.S.-
Mexican defense relations should be something that the U.S. must commit to; however, 
not through building its military capacity to address the security concerns both country 
face, but focusing in shaping a trustful relation.   
The security assistance is an important diplomatic tool, which if used right, can 
provide the U.S. with effective results in building a true relationship with the partner 
nations. However, in the case of Mexico, this is not the case. Despite the high amount of 
funding allocated for security assistance programs, IMET has not become the most 
instrumental tool for influencing the Mexican military. Additionally, from all the students 
attending the IMET courses, less than 35 percent attend PME courses (see Figure 14).149 
The rest of the IMET courses involved specialized technical training. This is an issue 
because the other security assistance programs can pay most of the specialized technical 
training. It is important to determine that the strategy in place regarding the international 
training is not to simply focus on building trust, but also to build capacities. It is possible 
to do this with another country, but not easily with the next-door neighbor to the U.S. 
Building partnership capacities does not imply future collaboration; however, it does 
establish the basis for an enduring partnership. 
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Figure 14.  PME student versus total IMET students 
The preparation of specialized U.S. forces that can truly understand the cultural, 
institutional, and historical barriers is indeed a missed opportunity. Before this 
opportunity is further missed, the U.S. military must be familiar with Mexico in order to 
plan for any mutual strategy or policy. In the “Joint Operating Environment of 2008,” 
Mexico (the fourteenth largest economy in the world)150 was considered on the verge of a 
becoming a “collapsed” state.151 This inaccurate statement bruised the bilateral military 
relations between the U.S. and Mexican officials. The sensitivity of this relation must be 
recognized by all U.S. military members in order to make conscientious and effective 
policies and strategies. 
Finally, USNORTHCOM priorities in regards to the use of IMET for PME are 
critical to bridging this trusting gap. USNORTHCOM is looking for capacity building 
instead of looking to future engagements. All actors involved in this process have limited 
their focus on counter-terrorism and the war against drugs. William Knight states that the 
“theater security cooperation with Mexico is limited to anti-drug trafficking operations 
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and senior officer visits with Mexican counterparts.”152 BPC might not be the most 
important strategy for an enduring partnership. Noting the historical relations between 
both countries, a new strategy in security assistance is critical. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, historical military relations between the U.S. and Mexico provide a 
better understanding of why distrust has haunted both sides for a very long time. The 
historical events present a roadblock, which continues to prevent the growth of a trusting 
relationship between these two entities. Despite U.S. efforts to build the capacities of the 
Mexican Armed Forces, distrust continues to be the most relevant factor affecting this 
relationship. The Security Assistance Program becomes a key component in supporting 
U.S. foreign policies. A complex BPC process that delegates different authorities and 
responsibilities to different actors in an effort to exercise security cooperation becomes 
relevant as strategies and policies are developed. Ultimately, strategic decisions and 
polices must come from the USNORTHCOM, as it begins to establish its full 
commitment to the Mexican military in efforts to build an enduring trusting partnership.   
Finally, in an effort to build partnership capacity, the U.S. security assistance 
programs are not entirely developed to build security cooperation mechanisms that 
establish the pillars for a relationship based on trust. An emphasis of using IMET for 
specialized training, limits the U.S. ability to truly influence and express U.S. 
commitments to the Mexican Armed Forces. The relations between governments are like 
a pendulum. Sometimes it is on the right; sometimes it is on the left. Militaries are shaped 
to protect their countries, despite the government that is in place. The U.S. government 
should take advantage of current favorable conditions to close the gap between these two 
military organizations. The limited interaction of these two institutions, whether because 
of political or historical factors, has identified the need for policies to mold trust building 
in current military generations. Chapter IV will provide recommended policies that will 
move forward in that direction.    
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This final chapter will address the practicality of a trust building model that set 
the platform for several policy recommendations to enhance U.S.-Mexico military-to-
military relations. The policy recommendations are focused in elaborating a continuous 
process to enable a calculated strategy developing a trust building approach between 
these two institutions. This section will analyze and use a trust building model of 
strategic relationships as the framework to provide these policy recommendations that 
will focus in building an interdependent social structure between these two military 
institutions. Consequently, this section will argue that the a sound strategy for building 
partnership trust from USNORTHCOM, the use and expansion of the BPC PME 
platforms, and a solid policy of institution-building through an indirect approach will 
pave the way for a trusting relationship. To conclude, this section will summarize the key 
influences and cooperation elements of the U.S.-Mexico defense relations and highlight 
some opportunities for further research.  
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Creating a strategic vision through security cooperation initiatives that will 
increase military diplomacy and commitment between these two institutions is the most 
adequate route to build a solid relation based on trust. A model build upon a social 
exchange framework can be useful in understanding the essence of “partnerships,” 
particularly between international strategic alliances.153 The following policy 
recommendations are created not only with the focus on continuing building Mexico 
defense and security capacities, but most importantly to concentrate in our capabilities to 
influence a new generation of cross-cultural “superstars” that will lead the way for future 
military engagements. 
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1. Using an Integrative Model of Strategic Relationships  
To better understand the recommended policies we must first analyze an 
integrative trust-building model of strategic relationships. This model was developed to 
further emulate the necessary steps for an interdependent relation based on mutual 
commitments. The foundation for this model was built upon two different theories: 1) the 
social exchange theory; and 2) the dependency theory. The social exchange theory 
assumes “actors behave in ways to increase outcomes they value positively and decrease 
those they value negatively in relationships.”154 This theory sustains that through 
interactions between two different entities develop relationships of dependency and 
interdependency. In the other hand, the “Dependency theory suggests that each 
participant’s behavior produce mutual benefit through exchange and his/her outcome is 
dependent upon behavior of the other participant.”155 This dependency theory is different 
from the dependency theory of underdevelopment. In this particular theory, a dependency 
environment produces the conditions for a stronger and more compatible relationship 
between two organizations. Bonding methodologies used to create trust and commitment 
in a relationship produces these conditions. Figure 15 presents the model of these 
different bonding methodologies as they attempt to establish a strategic alliance based on 
trust.156   






Figure 15.  Relationship Bonding in International Strategic Alliances U.S.-Mexico157 
The two bonding methodologies described by this model are defined as structural 
and social bonding. According Carlos Rodriguez and David Wilson, “Structural bonds 
are the multiplicity of economic, strategic, and technical factors that develop during a 
relationship involving explicit business benefits through technology and market.”158 One 
might also believe that internal and external security threats are also a means for 
structural bonding. A trust-building architecture can also be beneficial in establishing 
processes that can assist in bonding these entities.159 Subsequently, “as familiarity, 
friendship, and personal confidence are built through interpersonal exchange, social 
bonding can measure the strength of personal relationships, and may range from a 
business to a close personal tie.”160 According to findings in the use and influences of 
these different methodologies, the perception of trust building for the Mexicans is 
affected by the social bonding tendencies of this culture. In contrast, Americans are 
derived by the influence in structural bonding to develop trust. If the U.S. military 
pretends to develop BPC initiatives in effort to build trust, it must first balance its 
influence by developing social bonding conditions where personal and institutional 
interdependence will be major determinants for its level of commitment with the Mexican 
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Armed Forces. As Rodriguez and Wilson noted, “social bonds lubricate the working of 
the relationship.”161 These relations must demonstrate a sense of commitment and 
reassurance of well-intended actions by both parties. Distrust must be “reduced slowly, 
gradually, and on the basis of persuasive evidence that the reality is changing.”162 
Bonding with future leaders is critical to enhance defense cooperation. The following 
policies can assist in the transition of balancing these bondings for greater strategic 
alliances effect.163      
2. Policy Recommendations 
In efforts to engage in BPC activities that will help us balance U.S.-Mexico 
defense relations, the following policy and strategic recommendations can be used to 
develop a committed relationship based on trust. These policy recommendations will help 
bridge the gap between both military institutions. First, USNORTHCOM could provide 
direct strategic guidance and control of BPC activities to build “partnership trust.” 
Second, the enhancement of different PME BPC platforms is crucial for long-term 
effects. Finally, the DOD could develop an institution-building strategy through an 
indirect approach. These recommendations are relevant to the security cooperation, but 
most importantly, they will define the commitment and trustworthiness of the U.S. 
Armed Forces, despite of any political interference between both nations.  
a. Policy Recommendation 1: Strategic Guidance for Building Partnership 
Trust 
An active role of USNORTHCOM in the strategic guidance and control of BPC 
activities is crucial; however, the emphasis should be more in building partnership trust 
rather than BPC. USNORTHCOM BPC objectives should render focus in developing a 
relation where “advanced” BPC activities dominate the security cooperation realm 
between these two institutions. Figure 16 shows the relations and the different categories 
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of BPC activities.164 The most important of these BPC activities is education. Education 
allows members within the armed forces to truly identify the critical difference between 
both organizations and adapt to establish a more profound relation. USNORTHCOM can 
make this happen by ensuring IMET funds are allocated mostly to PME activities.    
 
Figure 16.  Relationships Among BPC Activities165 
This strategic plan must be directed to the service components and the SCO. 
Incorporating a trust-building strategy and directive is the crucial step for the combatant 
command (COCOM) to develop to establish a BPC environment where the focus is to 
develop mutual understanding and commitment. This directive should help the service 
components and the SCO to funnel their influence on BPC activities that will establish 
long-term engagements with the Mexican Armed Forces. A COCOM guidance that will 
assist in the professionalization of the Mexican military through enhanced PME program 
will only help bridge the cross-cultural gap. These programs are the gateway to create a 
“social bonding” environment, which in turn, will facilitate our ability to project trust and 
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commitment to our southern neighbors. Nevertheless, DOD has a number of BPC 
platforms that enable and execute PME programs. 
b. Policy Recommendation 2: Enhance/Advocate BPC Platforms that 
Focuses in PME Programs 
DOD has a number of PME schools, such as the war colleges and the command 
staff colleges that provide a unique capability of advancing and preparing future military 
leaders. These institutions are critical in developing the military diplomacy at the 
strategic level with all partner nations; however, they are limited to English-speakers and 
might be too late to develop a cross-cultural conscience between U.S. and Mexican 
military officers who have been in the institution for a long time. It is difficult to change 
the culture of an organization from the top. USNORTHCOM can elaborate a concise plan 
to enhance capabilities to other BPC platforms that can maximize the level of influence 
for future U.S. and Mexican military leaders. The Inter-American Defense College 
(IADC), the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), and 
Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) are vital BPC platforms to set the stage 
for building trust mechanisms through their internal PME programs.  
The IADC provides PME and multidisciplinary graduate level courses for senior 
military members with a focus of better understanding the international environment and 
the current security issues affecting the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world. 
Over 40 percent of the graduates have advanced to general officers rank or high civilian 
leadership positions within their institutions. The IADC is limited to officers in the 
operational level, but it offers the language convenience to higher education in the United 
States. The IADC cadre is composed of partner nation’s instructors that provide different 
cultural and operational perspectives. This BPC platform educates members of the U.S. 
in a collaborative environment with their LATAM counterparts.166 
WHINSEC is another effective BPC platform that focuses not only in the 
technical training capabilities, but also in distinctive PME and leadership programs. 
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WHINSEC programs were designed to support USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM 
strategic objectives. This institution has “developed and implemented meaningful and 
effective training in the Profession of Arms that includes democracy and human rights, 
ethics, and stewardship, making its program one of the best offered by military 
educational institutions anywhere.”167 Its PME courses are developed not only for mid-
level and junior officers, but also for noncommissioned officers. These courses are also 
taught in Spanish and but also include U.S. military students within their certified PME 
programs. This scenario provides opportunities of direct engagement with future military 
leaders in the Western Hemisphere. 
IAAFA also provides one of the most critical PME capabilities for partner nations 
and U.S. service members. Since 2008, the PME programs have advanced BPC initiatives 
to new heights. IAAFA conducted the first ever U.S.-developed mobile PME programs 
for officers and non-commissioned officers. Besides the great volume of different 
technical training capabilities, it also produced one of the most desired PME programs in 
the Western Hemisphere. Like WHINSEC, IAAFA has the capability to conduct mobile 
training team (MTT) courses. In 2011, IAAFA deployed two MTTs to the Heroico 
Colegio Militar to conduct PME programs to Mexican Army, Air Force, and Naval junior 
commissioned officer. U.S. Air Force officers and Noncommissioned officers attend the 
certified IAAFA PME courses where they directly engage with all future LATAM 
military leaders. According to Captain O. Martinez, “the impact these courses are making 
in terms of building partnerships and building partner nation’s capacity in Latin America 
has been tremendous. The impact that is now building cultural savvy United States Air 
Force Airmen is immeasurable.”168 IAAFA has dramatically increased its BPC role and 
scope since 1943, evolving its training and PME programs to meet partner nation’s 
requirements and U.S. strategic objectives.169  
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USNORTHCOM should focus in enhancing and supporting these institutions who 
can lead the way in BPC through their PME Spanish programs. These institutions are the 
“ground zero” for future development of military diplomacy and cooperation between the 
United States and Mexico. Building up the capacity and support for these critical BPC 
platforms will pave the way to establish an indirect approach for future bilateral military 
cooperation. 
c. Policy Recommendation 3: Institution-building Through an Indirect 
Approach  
The Mexican constitution is one of the biggest hurdles that the Mexican Armed 
Forces face when confronting any development to enhance a military-to-military 
relationship with the United States. According to Jeffrey Burkett, this “relationship has 
been hindered by the traditional Mexican policy of non-intervention an [Mexican] 
opposition to any form of joint [and combined] hemispheric defense force or other 
multilateral institution.”170 Therefore, DOD can influence institution-building through an 
indirect approach that involves advocating the increase of the bilateral exchange program, 
widening the gates for Mexican military cadets to U.S. military academies, and 
supporting specialized U.S. Mexico relations programs/projects for a selected foreign 
area officer core.   
The exchange programs are an advance activity that is limited by the Mexican 
constitution; however, USNORTHCOM, service components and the SCO should 
encourage from both sides. Opening a lifeline of exchange officers would give both sides 
a better understanding of the organizational culture of these institutions, which will 
render higher chances to develop stronger defense relations. These particular BPC 
advance activity has historically assist two military institutions to build trust among other 
nations. After WWII, the French and the Germans initiated bilateral exchange programs, 
which helped the defense relations between both countries. Additionally, DOD must 
advocate and promote greater opportunities for Mexican Armed Forces to attend U.S. 
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military academies. The formation stage of future military leaders is the right stage to 
solidify institutional interdependency relations.171   
Finally, a greater investment to produce a qualified cadre of Mexican military 
experts who understand the Mexican military, political, and economic environment and 
will assist in future development of defense strategies and policies for bilateral 
cooperation is imperative. These experts will become a greater asset not only at the 
COCOM level, but also at service components and the SCO. The U.S. Marine Corps has 
taken a right step in this effort. They are currently sponsoring the U.S.-Mexico Security-
Development Partnership Project as a new initiative to establish a better understanding of 
U.S.-Mexico relations. This project seeks to link research and teaching to operational 
concerns with a degree of focus on the defense relations. Students from all the different 
services, including Mexican military officer participate in this extraordinary program. 
USNORTHCOM should make every effort to advocate, or possibly, sponsor this 
exceptional program. The development of this cadre will create trust pillars for the future 
of U.S.-Mexico defense relations.   
B. CONCLUSION 
For more than a century, U.S.-Mexico defense relations have changed and 
evolved. This thesis identified main factors that caused the relatively low level of trust 
characterized in U.S.-Mexican defense relations. The lack of understanding of the 
organizational culture, the historic events that continue to mold the perceptions within the 
Mexican institutions, and the wrong policies and strategies used within the BPC realm 
have hindered the advancement of a relation based on trust. Nevertheless, both 
institutions, particularly the Mexican Armed Forces, have faced challenges that have also 
limited their ability to strengthen and build upon a trusting military-to-military 
partnership. As Rodriguez and Wilson noted, “Trust has been identified a condition for 
cooperation and prerequisite for successful strategic alliances.”172 The research 
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identifies—through a historical, cultural, and political analysis—that indeed, “trust” is 
what is missing. 
Consequently, prior U.S.-military engagements with the Mexican military have 
been ineffective in shaping a relationship based on trust. The 9/11 event and the current 
militarization of Mexico in response to security threat caused by TCOs have limited the 
focus for a better bilateral defense relation. This research study highlights the historical 
and cultural paradigms that have challenged the relationship between the U.S. and 
Mexican militaries while highlighting the different venues that could be used to work 
around those challenges. To better operate in a joint environment the U.S. military must 
be fully acquainted with the evolution, the culture and challenges of the Mexican Armed 
Forces.  
Despite the historical emphasis, cultural barriers, and the challenges faced by the 
Mexican Armed Forces, the conditions in which this institution has evolved is placed 
directly between the civil-military relations established throughout its creation. An 
historical background of the Mexican Armed Forces, to include its profound civil-
military relation, and the evolution and transformation of the force revealed that the 
Mexican military was caught between a revolutionary mentality and civilian dominance. 
This study also presents the Mexican historical evolution as a “perverse cycle” of 
Militarization–Revolution–Demilitarization–Democratization–Remilitarization. The 
division of the Mexican Armed Forces (SEDENA and SEMAR) left a structural and 
operational whole of accountability amongst these martial institutions. 
Additionally, this study also elaborated cultural differences, in particular, the 
professionalization efforts compared to the U.S. Armed Forces, and an extreme vertical 
culture that continues to challenge the development of an institution that thrives for 
recognition. This study identifies the challenges that the Mexican military faces in the 
beginning of this century. Professionalization, defense structure, joint collaboration, and 
budget are critical areas that continue to test this respected institution. This thesis 
highlights that the challenges faced by the Mexican military—mixed with the cultural 
differences—must be fully understood in order to provide concrete policies and strategies 
that will favor both institutions.   
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This thesis also provides an analysis of historical military relations between the 
U.S. and Mexico, and presents events that that where critical in understanding why 
“distrust” has haunted both sides for a very long time. Historical events present a 
roadblock, which continues to prevent the growth of a trusting relationship between these 
two entities. Despite U.S. efforts to build the capacities of the Mexican Armed Forces, 
distrust continues to be the most relevant factor affecting this relationship. The Security 
Assistance Program has become a key component in supporting U.S. foreign policies. A 
complex BPC process that delegates different authorities and responsibilities to different 
actors in an effort to exercise security cooperation becomes relevant as strategies and 
policies are developed; however, the strategies and policies built since 2002 have not 
been the most preferable to build “trust” with the Mexican counterparts. The thesis also 
shows evidence that U.S. security assistance programs are not entirely developed to build 
security cooperation mechanisms that establish the pillars for a relationship based on 
trust. An emphasis of using IMET for specialized training, limits the U.S. ability to truly 
influence and express U.S. commitments to the Mexican Armed Forces. The limited 
interaction of these two institutions, whether because of political or historical factors, has 
identified the need for policies to mold trust building in current military generations.  
Finally, through an analysis and the use of an integrative trust-building model, 
several policy recommendations were offered to ensure better cooperation between both 
militaries to meet the security challenges confronting North America and to enhance trust 
building mechanisms that will solidify defense relations well into the twenty-first century 
and beyond. These policy recommendations included a sound strategy for building 
partnership trust from USNORTHCOM, the use and expansion of the BPC PME 
platforms (i.e., IADC, WHINSEC, and IAAFA), and a solid policy of institution-building 
through an indirect approach. As both countries continue to face mutual economic and 
security challenges, interdependency, at all institutional levels, becomes primordial. 
Current U.S.-Mexico relations are much better than it used to be. The U.S. Armed Forces 
should take advantage to implement new trust-building mechanisms that will not only 
help bridge the security cooperation gap, but also build a framework based on trust and 
total commitment. 
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APPENDIX A. SEDENA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
Following is the organizational chart of the Mexican Secretary of National 
Defense (SEDENA).173 
 
Figure 17.  SEDENA Organizational Structure Chart 
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APPENDIX B. SEMAR ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
Following is the organizational chart of the Mexican Secretary of the Navy 
(SEDENA)174 
 
Figure 18.  SEMAR Organizational Structure Chart 
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